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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Leslie Ann Burgoine for the Master of Arts in 
History presented August 16, 1996. 
Title: Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, and Democracy in China 
Democracy was one of the many Western ideas that began to be 
discussed among the Chinese intellectual elite in the last decades of the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Liang Qichao (1873-1929), a leader of the 1895-98 
Reform Movement, and Hu Shi (1891-1962), a central figure of the 1915-27 
New Culture Movement, were two of the most influential proponents of 
democracy in modern Chinese history. Liang and Hu linked their 
meanings of democracy with the highest goals for China, national strength 
and modernity. 
Liang Qichao was a revolutionary in advocating the opening of 
participation in politics to people outside the official government structure 
through his leadership role in the 1895 Protest Petition. His abundant 
writings on political events and prescriptions for reform aroused the 
attention of a wider population than had previously considered national 
issues. Liang promoted political reforms during the years up to the 1911 
Revolution, and then took a direct role in politics in the early Republic. 
Hu Shi expanded on the meaning of democracy to include social and 
political change. He, too, wrote prolifically and was a key figure in the 
literary renaissance which aimed to promote education of a broader 
spectrum of the populace by the use of the vernacular in writing. While 
Hu did not participate directly in political life, he was a constant advocate 
of democratic institutions and social and cultural progress. 
Both Liang and Hu placed a high value on education and tirelessly 
promoted the exploration of new ideas as the path to modernity. They 
both harshly criticized the governments under which they worked but 
preferred gradual reform rather than radical revolution. While their 
understanding of democracy differed in their generational contexts and 
personal experiences, they believed that thoughtful participation in politics 
and society was the core essence of democracy and modernity. 
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A NOTE ABOUT TRANSLATIONS AND ROMANIZATIONS 
Translations of Chinese sources are mine only where indicated. 
Many of Hu Shi's writings are originally in English; the bibliography lists 
primary and secondary sources separately. 
For the romanization of Chinese names and terms in the text, this 
paper uses the modern pinyin system, developed in the People's Republic 
of China and now commonly used in the United States for Chinese words 
and names. The only exception in the text are the names Sun Yat-sen and 
Chiang Kai-shek, still more recognizable in their original Wade-Giles 
rendering. If I have quoted a secondary source that used the Wade-Giles 
system, I have changed the Chinese words in the quote into pinyin but left 
the source notation in its original form in the footnotes and bibliography. 
There is a glossary following the text in which to check the pinyin with the 
Chinese characters. I have used the simplified Chinese characters, used on 
the mainland, in the glossary. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Liang Qichao (1873-1929) and Hu Shi (1891-1962) were two of the 
most influential proponents of political and social reform in modern 
Chinese history. Their lifetimes span several decades of momentous 
revolutionary transformation in China, and their lives and thought reflect 
the intellectual and political changes that moved their country in new 
directions. 
The reform movement of 1895-98 and the May Fourth Movement 
two decades later, in which Liang and Hu, respectively, played leading 
roles, saw the first interest in some form of democracy for China. The 
meaning of democracy changed over time and differed in its 
interpretations among those who discussed it. In my thesis, I will explore 
the ideas and lives of Liang and Hu in order to understand the Chinese 
perspective on the meaning of democracy. How did Liang and Hu 
understand democracy, a Western idea, in both its philosophical and 
practical aspects? How did they apply these ideas to China and in their 
own political lives? And what impact did Liang and Hu actually have on 
the events of their time and later? 
In this introductory chapter, I will first review the historical 
background leading up to Liang and Hu's lifetimes. Then I will discuss 
democracy as one of many Western ideas explored by Chinese intellectuals 
in this era. 
2 
For most of its long history, China had been the center of the East 
Asian political and cultural sphere, and had expected and received the 
honor and tribute of the neighbors on its periphery. Even when conquered 
by the Mongols of the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) and the Manchus of the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), China remained Chinese; the Mongols and the 
Manchus adopted the Chinese political apparatus, as would any newly 
ruling Hanl Chinese family, and co-opted Chinese culture as a way of 
legitimizing their rule rather than impose their own on the new dynasty.2 
When the first Westerners, the Portuguese, arrived off the South China 
coast in the 1500s, the Chinese succeeded in conducting trade on their own 
terms under the close scrutiny of imperial officials.3 When Europeans and 
Americans first began to intrude on China,.s sovereignty in the mid-1800s, 
China's rulers for the first time had to confront outsiders who would not 
conform to the Chinese view of the world. 4 
1 "Han" is the term used to distinguish ethnic Chinese from minority 
groups of China, such as the Manchus and Mongols in the north, the 
Uighurs in the northwest, and the Miao and other groups in the 
southwest. 
2The Mongols and Manchus did make their mark on the Chinese political 
system and culture during their respective dynasties, but fundamental 
elements of the culture and society considered essentially Chinese 
remained dominant. 
3William Theodore deBary, Wing-Tsit Chan, and Chester Tan, eds. 
Sources of Chinese Tradition. Vol. 2. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1960) 1. 
4 For further reading on the early history of foreigners in China, see John 
K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign 
Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); John Wills, 
Pepper, Guns, and Parleys: The Dutch East India company and China, 1662-
1681 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); and Fu Lo-Shu, A 
3 
China's leaders were shocked and deeply troubled by these newest 
outsiders who challenged their belief in China's cultural and political 
superiority with their own Eurocentric outlook. The initial challenge was 
made by military force; therefore the first serious interest in the West was 
in its technological might. A few of the more adventurous among the 
Chinese elite decided the West was worth first-hand investigation and 
went abroad to study.5 Most of them concentrated on acquiring th~ 
technological knowledge that China lacked in relation to Western 
countries. China's educated elites were watching their country become 
increasingly weakened by the Opium Wars and the unequal treaties at the 
hands of the West and therefore were devoted to the preservation and 
strengthening of China against invasive Western powers.6 Many 
provincial leaders attempted to incorporate Western technology in arms 
development and to study science-related subjects such as mathematics in 
Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820) (Tucson: 
Arizona University Press, 1966). 
5for further reading on China's nineteenth century interest in the West, 
see Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime 
World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Immanuel Hsu, 
China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-
1880 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Thomas LaFargue, 
China's First Hundred: Educational Mission Students in the United States, 
1872-1881 (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1987). 
6 For further reading on China's wars and treaties with the Western 
powers in the nineteenth century, see John K. Fairbank, Trade and 
Diplomacy on the China Coast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1953); Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800-
1842 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1951); Gerald Graham, The 
China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830-1860 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978); and Teng Ssu-yu, Chang Hsi and the Treaty of 
Nanking, 1842 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944). 
4 
the so-called Self-Strengthening Movement beginning in the 1860s. The 
slogan of the day was xr xue wez tz I zhong xue Wel yang: Chinese learning 
should remain the essence, but Western learning should be used for 
practical development. 
China's leaders were not only threatened by foreign invaders, but 
the latter half of the nineteenth century saw numerous internal rebellions, 
from the Taiping rebellion of 1851-1864 to the Boxer Uprising of 1900. The 
primary responsibility for putting down these rebellions rested on 
provincial leaders, who raised local armies to suppress the rebels. The 
suppression of ethnic and peasant rebellions, as well as the provincially-led 
Self-Strengthening Movement, served to enhance and militarize the forces 
of regionalism. This, of course, meant a weaker Qing central government 
and foreshadowed the warlord period of the early Republic? 
Towards the end of the 1800s, more and more Chinese leaders came 
to realize that acquiring Western technology was not enough and that 
China's weakness was more deeply rooted in its political culture. The most 
shocking event was China's defeat in 1895 in Manchuria by Japan, 
historically a tributary state, and the resulting Treaty of Shimonoseki. As 
the incompetence of Qing rule became more and more apparent, China's 
entire imperial political system began to be questioned by reform-minded 
elites both within and outside government circles. 
7For more on late Qing militarization and regionalism, see Stanley 
Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-
Century Chinese Regionalism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1964) and Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: 
Militarization and Social Structure, 1789-1864 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1970). 
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A number of China's most insightful leaders began to wonder 
whether China's weakness was simply technological or whether it lay 
deeper. More profoundly, they considered what kind of changes China 
needed to undergo in order to meet the challenge of the modern world. 
What in China's political, social, and cultural heritage should be preserved 
and what should be transformed or even thrown out? This is not to say 
that the Chinese social and political system had remained static in the 
preceding centuries, for indeed it had not. However, change had been 
more gradual, and it is no exaggeration to say that the pace of change in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, and certainly in the twentieth 
century, was unprecedentedly swift. China's elite feared the end of 
Chinese civilization as they understood it. As the severity of the crisis 
became more apparent to educated Chinese, the scope of their exploration 
of foreign ideas broadened in order to sustain China. Their utmost 
concern was the preservation of the Chinese nation, and now the idea that 
some form of political reform was needed began to be discussed. 
A few Chinese who studied abroad in the late nineteenth century 
were interested not only in Western technology but also in Western 
culture and ideas. One of the most famous was Yan Fu (1853-1921)8, who 
translated such books as John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, Charles 
Montesquieu's Defense of the Spirit of the Laws, Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations and, most importantly, Thomas Huxley's Evolution and Ethics. 
Yan added to his translation of Huxley a commentary and interpretation, 
8 See especially Benjamin Schwartz, Yen Fu and the West: The Search for 
Wealth and Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). 
6 
On Evolution, in which the concept of Social Darwinism introduced 
Chinese intellectuals to a new way to analyze China's predicament in the 
world, in terms of a racial and national struggle for "survival of the fittest." 
Social Darwinism also gave a prescription for progress by means of 
transforming and strengthening nation and society. These ideas had a 
tremendous impact in China from that time forward as they underlay 
nearly all Chinese thinkers' recommendations for progress, from 
democracy to Marxism, from moderate reformer Liang Qichao to 
Communist revolutionary Mao Zedong (1893-1976).9 
The crisis precipitated by the shocking defeat by Japan in 1895 and 
the accompanying treaty was the impetus for reform at the higher levels of 
government. The events of the protest petitions submitted in 1895, 
involving Liang Qichao, can be seen as the first democratic political event 
in China, as it is the first time that people without official positions felt 
that they should be allowed to influence government policy.10 The 
dramatic nature of this event and the following reform period of 1895-1898 
brought what once were extreme ideas directly to the attention of the 
highest imperial leaders.11 Moreover, most of these ideas were commonly 
accepted only a few years later; the idea that some kind of reform at the 
dynastic level was necessary and the idea that people outside of the official 
9for more on the impact of Darwinism in China, see James Reeve Pusey, 
China and Charles Darwin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
10 Andrew J. Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985) x, 46. 
1 lsee Luke K. S. Kwong, A Mosaic of the Hundred Days: Personalities, 
Politics, and Ideas of 1898 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
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structure of the government had a role to play became commonly accepted 
assumptions. 
The purpose, of course, was to strengthen China. Reform-minded 
Chinese noted that the strongest nations in the world were based on some 
form of democratic principle, from the republican system with a popular 
electorate of the United States to the constitutional monarchies of Japan 
and England, and they began to consider what these kinds of political 
systems could mean for China. First and foremost it meant opening up 
awareness and participation in government to the general population; this 
concept coincided with the Chinese political belief in the harmonic ties 
between ruler and ruled, ties traditionally maintained by the hierarchical 
structure of government officials. The idea that communication between 
ruler and ruled needed repair in order to strengthen the nation was not 
new, but the idea that general participation, and even protest, could 
strengthen the nation was definitely foreign. 
The discussion of China's modernization often orients tradition and 
modernity at opposite and opposing poles; China's traditional social and 
political system was considered by many to work against its ability to 
modernize, and modernization was seen as destructive of traditional 
culture. However, all societies display both elements of their traditional 
roots and elements of modernity. More importantly, tradition and 
modernity are not static states of being. Indeed, both the understanding of 
tradition and the understanding of modernity constantly undergo change 
and redefinition as societies face new challenges and search for the best 
8 
solutions.12 Some historians have written that, as Liang and Hu related 
democracy to China's modernization as well as elements of traditional 
culture, they were "emotionally tied" to the past or that there is a "tension" 
in their thinking.13 Instead, it seems that their effort to meld modern and 
traditional concepts is a natural and universal adaptation in the face of 
rapid change. 
Nationalism, too, is still being debated in its historical and 
contemporary contexts. The rise of modern nationalism in China is 
usually dated to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; peasant 
nationalism expressed itself in the form of rebellions, and elite 
nationalism was expressed in the reform and revolutionary movements. 
It can be argued that the construct of China's enduring social and political 
history, with its theories of the relationship between the state and the 
people, suggests that there had long existed an awar~ness in smaller 
communities of belonging to a larger political entity, a national identity.1 4 
Nonetheless, the newness of the development of Chinese nationalism in 
12See Benjamin I. Schwartz, "Culture, Modernity, Nationalism -- Further 
Reflections," In Tu Wei-ming, ed. China in Transformation. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1994) 233-253; Michael Gasster, "Reform and 
Revolution in China's Political Modernization," In Mary Clabaugh 
Wright, ed. China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) 67-96; and Paul A. Cohen, Between 
Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). 
13For a historiographical critique of writings on the intellectual history of 
modern China, see Lung-kee Sun, "Historians' Warp: Problems in 
Textualizing the Intellectual History of Modern China," Positions: East 
Asian Cultural Critique 2: 2 (Fall 1994): 355-381. 
14Prasenjit Duara, "De-constructing the Chinese Nation," Australian 
Journal of Chinese Affairs 30 (July 1993): 1-26. 
9 
the nineteenth century rests on the fact that it arose out of confrontation 
with invading outside forces and that the sentiment was used by political 
leaders, whether peasant rebels or scholar revolutionaries, to motivate the 
general population for political and social change. China's modern 
nationalism was a response to Western and Japanese imperialism, and on 
the elite level, the threat to the nation warranted reform and revolution. 
It was in this context of nationalism and modernity that democracy 
was advocated; it could be said that democracy was attractive for its 
connotations of modernity and was pursued in order to serve nationalistic 
ends. Chinese intellectuals of this period were first concerned with 
China's strength, and it is only natural that democracy's most important 
value was its potential for strengthening the nation.IS While it was 
agreed that the goal was a strong, modern China and that some form of 
democracy was necessary, controversy remained over the synthesis of 
traditional and modern ideas and the institutions that would make the 
best form of democracy for China. 
Liang Qichao and Hu Shi, as the two foremost leaders of their 
generations, were, at their foundation, patriotic advocates of a strong, 
modern China. Their understanding and advocacy of democracy differed 
in their generational contexts and personal experiences but correlated in 
their shared search for Chinese modernity. 
15For the argument that May Fourth intellectuals and others valued 
democracy as much for its protection of individual rights, see Hung-Yok Ip, 
"Liang Shuming and the Idea of Democracy in Modern China," Modern 




Liang Qichao was born in a small village of the southern province of 
Guangdong in 1873 into a lower class gentry family. Educated in the 
Confucian classics at an early age, he showed great promise as a student 
and his family made every effort to further his education. He passed the 
provincial-level civil service examinations at 16 and the impressed official 
examiner offered his sister in marriage, a practice not uncommon in 
traditional China.1 However, this was the highest level degree that Liang 
would attain, never passing the triennial metropolitan exams in Beijing. 
Nonetheless, his achievements were revolutionary and brilliant. 
This study will focus on the periods of Liang's early activism, 1895 to 1898, 
and his exile in Japan, 1898 to 1911, showing the development of his 
political ideas. I will conclude by following his struggle to put those ideas 
into practice when he held various political offices in the early Republic, 
1912-1919. In 1919, Liang dropped out of politics and concentrated his 
energy on scholarly work at Qinghua University in Beijing. 
1895 to 1898: Liang's Early Activism 
Liang began studying at a prestigious academy in Canton at age 14 in 
1887, and in 1890 he was introduced to Kang Youwei (1858-1927)2, a radical 
1 Chang Hao. Liang Ch' i-ch 'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-
1907 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) 58. 
2For more on Kang Youwei, see Hsiao Kung-chuan, A Modern China and 
a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian (Seattle: University 
1 1 
scholar whose ideas upset the assumptions of Liang's earlier training in 
which the Confucian conception of politics and the social order were 
unquestioned. Kan.g's extreme ideas, "as though with the thunderous 
sound of the surf, and the roar of a lion"3, were, in Liang's words: 
.. .like a cold shower for me, or a blow right at the head with [the 
Zen master's] staff, suddenly depriving me of my defenses, leaving 
me dazzled without knowing what to do. I was both shocked and 
delighted, embittered and remorseful, frightened and uncertain.4 
Liang quit the academy and studied under Kang for four years, a period of 
intellectual and political excitement in which the development of Lian.g's 
political ideas began. 
The Petition of 1895 
At the time Kang went north in 1895 to promote political reform, 
Liang, now 22, followed. They were both in Beijing to take the civil service 
examinations when the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ending the Sino-Japanese 
War (1894-1895), was signed; this was a shocking and humiliating defeat for 
China at the hands of a former tributary kingdom. Kang and Liang 
capitalized on the incensed fervor the conclusion of the treaty incited, and 
of Washington Press, 1975) and Chang Hao, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: 
Search for Order and Meaning (1890-1911) (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987). In addition to Kang, Chang Hao's work focuses on 
Tan Sitong (1865-1898), Chang Taiyan (1868-1936), and Liu Shipei (1884-
1919). 
3Philip C. Huang. Liang Ch' i-ch 'ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972) 12. 
4Nathan, Chinese Democracy 47. 
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convinced over 1200 examination candidatesS to join them in petitioning 
the court to protest the terms of the treaty and request institutional reform. 
The petition of 18956 was the beginning of an intensified reform 
movement for Kang and Liang. This protest in 1895, termed by Liang as 
"the first step in the movement for popular government,"7 can be seen as 
the first democratic political event in China;8 it was the first time that a 
group of people outside the official government structure was mobilized to 
exert pressure on the government and push for policy changes.9 The 
significance of this petition cannot be overstated; formerly the right to 
submit memorials to the emperor was the special privilege of government 
officials. The idea that people without government posts should be 
allowed to oppose and influence government policy was the first step on 
the road to opening participation in politics to a wider Chinese populace. 
The opening, however, was still small and elite-dominated, as the 
5Chang 60; Nathan, Chinese Democracy 46. 
61n Chinese it was called the Gongche Petition; gongche means public 
vehicle, a term used for examination candidates who were entitled to 
travel to Beijing on public transportation. Joseph R. Levenson, Liang Ch 'i-
ch 'ao and the Mind of Modern China (New York: Harper and Row, 1959) 
19. 
7Levenson 19. 
8Nathan, Chinese Democracy x. 
9The petition included a broad range of requested reforms, including the 
rejection of the peace treaty, the transfer of the capital and administrative 
reforms, reform of the civil service examinations, expansion of the 
education system including the establishment of agriculture and business 
schools, revision of local government laws, and suggestions regarding 
public health and poor relief among others. Ssu-yu Teng and John K. 
Fairbank, eds. China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 
(New York: Antheneum, 1975) 148. 
participants in the 1895 petition were highly educated aspiring scholar-
officials. 
I 3 
After submitting the petition, the reform movement took on an 
expanded scope. Kang Y ouwei and Liang continued to petition the court 
but also moved to gain the broader support of the gentry-literati by 
organizing study societies and publishing newspapers. For a short while in 
the summer of 1895, the Self-Strengthening Study Society (Qiang Xuehuz) 
gathered in Beijing and a branch society was set up in Shanghai. Liang was 
appointed secretary of the Beijing society and edited a daily newspaper 
known as The Chinese and Foreign News (Zhongwai Gongbao). The 
paper contained only a few essays about current events and within three 
months was shut down (along with the Self-Strengthening Study Society) 
due to imperial court interference, but it had gained popularity among 
gentry-official circles in Beijing and gave Liang his first foray into 
journalism.1 O 
Modern Journalism and Political Reform 
A key to further broadening popular interest and influence on 
political events was the development of journalism in China, and Liang 
Qichao was a pioneer in this field. Traditional Chinese journals were 
copies of the imperial government's memorials and edicts distributed for 
the information of bureaucratic officials. Similar local newspapers were 
issued from provincial capitals, and popular newssheets were available 
whenever there was a fire, earthquake, riot, or sensational trial to report. 
lOChang 61-62; Huang 24-25. 
1 4 
Western missionaries can be credited with transforming traditional forms 
of news in China into modern propaganda in the early nineteenth century, 
when they printed and distributed their own periodicals as a method to 
win over new converts. The traditional purpose of news and instruction 
in China was intended to maintain and stabilize society, not to change it, to 
teach people, not to mobilize them. It was not long, however, before 
various Chinese revolutionary leaders also began to use journals and 
newpapers to unite and arouse their followers.11 
In addition, a non-governmental press emerged in the latter part of 
the 1800s to fill the demand for business information and, therefore, was 
concentrated in the treaty ports like Shanghai and Hong Kong. These 
newspapers focused on trade and commerce, staying away from major 
political issues. However, China's military defeat by Japan in 1895, 
resulting in Japan's opening of additional treaty ports on the Chinese coast, 
was reported in the business papers and incited a broader discussion of 
national politics among Chinese merchants. The implications of imperial 
policy and foreign domination of coastal cities now were a direct concern of 
Chinese traders as well as the scholar elite. As the politically concerned 
audience widened further in the cities, the political journal was created, 
primarily featuring editorial essays on both domestic and international 
11 The history of journalism in China, see Nathan, Chinese Democracy 133-
151. See also Roswell S. Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800-1912 
(Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1933) and Lee-hsia Hsu Ting, Government 
Control of the Press in Modern China, 1900-1949. (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1974.) 
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politics. This revolution in the field of journalism in China began in 1895 
with Liang's leadership. 
After failures in organizing additional study societies, Kang and 
Liang chose to carry out their movement through the publication of 
another newspaper. A number of reform-minded Shanghai elite invited 
Liang to edit a newspaper based there, and Liang began to write first for 
Current Affairs (Sh{wu Bao) and then for New Knowledge (ZhTxfn Bao). It 
was his essays written for these journals which first made Liang's name 
known as widely as Kang's. 
Kang and Liang were radical and modern not simply because they 
advocated reform, for reform had been advocated at various times in 
previous dynasties, but because they didn't look solely to historical 
precedents for their models of regeneration. They were radical because 
they considered adapting foreign political methods to aid China's progress 
and because their modernity was characterized by their reconciliation of 
the use of foreign political ideas with China's own tradition. Their specific 
radical modern method is the advocacy of popular participation in 
government. 
Liang Qichao wrote in the Sh{wu Bao in 1896: 
Why is it necessary to reform? ...... Those who advocate no change 
frequently claim, 'We follow the ancients, follow the ancients.' Do 
they know that from prehistoric, ancient, medieval and modern 
times down to the present day, there have been many hundreds of 
thousands and myriads of changes? ... Those who insist that there is 
no need for reform still say, 'Let us follow the ancients, follow the 
ancients.' They coldly sit and watch everything being laid waste by 
following tradition, and there is no concern in their hearts ... The 
Book of Changes says, 'When there is exhaustion, there should be 
change; after a change there is cohesion; when there is cohesion 
things will be long-lasting.'12 
1 6 
This quote shows that the method of Liang's argument includes a 
reconciliation of the traditional Chinese respect for historic precedent with 
the need for the adaptation of foreign ideas in order to meet the challenge 
of current conditions. Some historians have asserted that Liang is 
"emotionally tied" to Chinese tradition or that there is a "tension" in his 
thought and writings due to his tendency to blend Chinese tradition with 
the reforms he advocated; however, as others have pointed out, most 
societies possess both traditional and modern characteristics. China may be 
unique in the age of its written canonical traditions and its reverence for 
them, but it joins the company of many other nations in believing that 
modernization in the twentieth century necessitates western-style reforms. 
Teaching in Hunan Province 
Liang left Current Affairs in late 1897 and was invited to be the chief 
lecturer on Chinese studies at the newly established School of Current 
Affairs (Sh{wu Xuetang) in Hunan province, where a reform-minded 
governor and a group of progressive scholar-officials were instituting new 
schools, study societies, newspapers and businesses. Liang continued to 
develop his ideas through writing and even became involved in Hunan 
politics by submitting a number of petitions to the governor. In one of 
those petitions to the Hunan governor, Liang wrote: 
If we wish now to reform thoroughly, we must begin by 
establishing communication between the sentiments of those 
12Teng and Fairbank, "Doc. 42: Liang Ch'i-chao on Reform, 1896." 154-155. 
above and those below. If we wish to establish communication 
between the sentiments of those above and those below, then we 
must revive the intentions of the ancients, adopt Western 
institutions, and stress the authority ( quan) of the local 
districts ... [Toward these ends] we must develop the knowledge of 
the literati ... and fix the limits of authority (quan). What do I mean 
by delineating authority? The Westerners separate discussion and 
legislation (yzshz) from execution (x{ngshz). The legislators (yzshi 
zhiren) have the authority to decide upon general procedures 
( dzngzhang) but do not have the power to carry out such. The 
executors have the authority of implementation but do not have 
the authority of deciding upon general procedures. When 
something is about to be done, the assemblymen get together and 
deliberate over its advisability. If they approve, then they will 
discuss its procedures. After the procedures have been drafted, they 
are given to the administrator (yousl) to carry out. The 
administrator may not arbitrarily change them. If, in carrying 
them out, obstacles and difficulties are encountered, then he will 
inform the assemblymen who will in turn discuss and change 
them. The Westerners' laws for this reason are constantly 
changing and are refined with each change, becoming ever better 
adapted to the people's interests. This is because the assemblymen 
are elected by the people.13 
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Liang's aim to blend Chinese and Western political concepts in his 
prescription for reform are clear in this petition. His work in journalism 
and education in order to promote more educated political participation is 
not only modern but is consistent with the Confucian "intentions of the 
ancients" to revive "communication between the sentiments of those 
above and those below." 
Liang had advocated gradual reform when he was writing in Beijing 
and Shanghai, but he became frustrated by the slow progress his gradualist 
approach had been achieving. In Hunan Liang's lectures and activities 
took an increasingly radical turn. Not only did his lectures include anti-
13Huang 28. 
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Manchu sentiment and ideas regarding popular rights, he even submitted 
a petition to the Hunan governor proposing that, if necessary, he should 
declare Hunan independence. He argued that if the central government 
could not be forced to reform, then Hunan could secede, carry out its own 
reforms, and lead the eventual recovery of all China from foreign 
aggression.14 Thus Liang put himself among the most radical reformers of 
the period. 
As could be expected, a number of the Hunanese elite became 
alarmed at Liang's radical teachings and launched an ideological counter-
attack. Before the reaction became a total defeat for the Hunan reformists, 
in early 1898 Liang fell ill and had to leave Hunan for medical treatment in 
Shanghai. 
The Hundred Days of 1898 
By this time, reform activities began to intensify again in Beijing due 
to heightened concern over the Russian demand to lease Dairen and Port 
Arthur and the recent seizure of Jiaozhou Bay by Germany. After his 
treatment and a short rest in Shanghai, Liang left once again for Beijing to 
join Kang. 
Kang Youwei was able to gain an audience at the imperial court and 
temporary influence primarily due to a factional split within the court. 
One faction was centered around the young Emperor and the other around 
the aging and officially retired Empress Dowager who, due to her long 
tenure and experience, was still referred to on important matters by a 
14Chang 126-127. 
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number of the more powerful court officials. The weaker Emperor's 
faction was receptive to many of Kang's reformist suggestions, and the 
Emperor issued a series of edicts during the summer of 1898, later known 
as the Hundred Days of Reform. Conservative members of the court 
became alarmed at what they perceived to be progressively extreme reform 
edicts and persuaded the Empress-Dowager to reinstate her tutelage, thus 
bringing an end to the flurry of proclamations.15 Liang did not play a 
leading role in the Hundred Days, but he had been appointed to head a 
newly founded translation bureau and received imperial permission to 
establish a school for training translators.16 His close association with 
Kang Youwei meant that he, too, had to flee arrest and execution at the 
reform movement's abrupt end. Liang took his exile in Japan. 
Exile in Japan: The First Phase, 1898 to 1902 
Liang's move to Japan coincided with an increase in the number of 
Chinese students choosing Japan as their destination for study abroad. In 
the 1870s, when the first Chinese students were sent abroad to study under 
government sponsorship, they went to Europe and America with the goal 
of acquiring skills in Western science and technology. In the late 1890s and 
early 1900s, Japan became more attractive due to both its geographical and 
cultural proximity. More importantly, however, was the change in the 
intellectual climate; in addition to studying science and technology, 
15For an in-depth study of this movement, see Luke K.S. Kwong, A Mosaic 
of the Hundred Days, footnoted above. 
16Huang 27. 
Chinese students were open to a broader scope of interests, especially 
politics. Liang's arrival in Japan was a strong stimulant to the overseas 
Chinese intellectual climate there.17 
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Liang's first journal began publication barely two months after his 
arrival and was the well-known Journal of Disinterested Criticism (Qzngyz 
Bao). This journal came to an end in 1901 due to a fire, but in early 1902 
the bimonthly New Citizen (Xfnm(n Shuo) was established and continued 
publication until 1907. These journals were widely read among overseas 
Chinese and were so popular that they were smuggled into China and 
circulated hand to hand, making Liang the leading voice for reform in 
China. These years were the peak of Liang's influence, and the peak was 
high. While he himself wrote with discouragement, "My daily work 
consists of enslaving myself with pen and paper, producing empty words 
that are of no help in (overcoming) current national difficulties," most 
readers were inspired by him. He did not write in the heavy scholarly 
language but used a more vivid new style with "a sharp pen and 
overflowing emotion (that) deeply moved me", wrote one. "Even 
Napoleon at the height of his power could not have captivated a larger 
number of men in his armies than the numberless youths whom Liang 
held under the influence of his pen", one of Liang's translators asserted. 
To various people, he "stimulated my patriotic fervor" and was "a 
17Kang also initially fled to Japan but was forced to leave in 1899 due to 
diplomatic pressure from the Qing government. (Chang 133.) This also 
marked the point at which Kang's and Liang's ideas began to diverge more 
sharply, Kang becoming more conservative and Liang more progressive, 
soon eclipsing Kang's influence through his provocative essays. 
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fountain of wisdom" who "completely capped the times." A literary critic 
wrote in the 1950s that "every Chinese intellectual in the last fifty years has 
been influenced by Liang Qichao." Hu Shi wrote that Lian.g's essays were 
"capable of making us dance, of making us weep, of arousing us to a 
determined enthusiasm. "18 
Education was the primary method by which Liang believed that the 
populace could be moved to participate in politics and make China a 
stronger nation. Through his writings, Liang introduced new Western 
ideas to his readers and wrote of the political changes he hoped to see in 
China. He also undertook the founding and head mastering of the Great 
Harmony High School (Gaodeng Datang Xu~xiao) in Tokyo in 1899, 
established to provide higher education for the children of overseas 
Chinese, and financed by Chinese merchants in Japan. 
Liang also maintained his involvement in more directly political 
activities. Kang Youwei and Liang both thought of the human and 
financial potential of their contacts with millions of overseas Chinese, and 
soon after Kang left Japan in 1899, he organized the Protect the Emperor 
Society (Baohuang Huz) in Canada as the formal organization of the 
reformists, of which Liang was an important member. 
Liang and Sun Yat-sen: Reform or Revolution 
At about the same time, another important overseas Chinese figure 
rapidly gaining a large following was Sun Yat-sen, whose revolutionary 
Revive China Society (Xingzhong Hu~) had been active for a number of 
18Nathan, Chinese Democracy 47-48. 
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years.19 Sun's followers mainly resided in the treaty ports, the secret 
societies in south China, and the overseas Chinese communities, but the 
potential of the newly politically-oriented student groups began to attract 
his attention too. Kang and Liang had to decide whether to regard Sun's 
group as possible allies or as rivals. In a more fundamental sense, they had 
to consider whether they were advocating reform or revolution, a 
dilemma that all Chinese political activists had to contend with at this 
time. 
Before 1903, Liang was more inclined toward cooperation than Kang. 
Kang believed that reform was the best direction for China, and it seems 
that Liang, rather than disagreeing with Kang ideologically over the reform 
or revolution approach, primarily was interested in the quickest way to 
change and therefore was more open to different methods. As discussed 
above regarding his rather radical activities in Hunai:- but his support for 
the more moderate reform movement, Liang held both radical and 
gradualist viewpoints at the same time. Therefore it seems less accurate to 
characterize his entire political outlook in Japan as radical than to say that 
his ideas included both reformist and revolutionary tendencies. 
Kang became upset that Liang was cooperating with Sun Yat-sen and 
ordered Liang to go to Hawaii to garner support there for Kang's Protect the 
Emperor Society. Liang was already well-known in Hawaii due to his 
popular writings, and while there, Liang joined the local triad society and 
19For further reading on Sun Yat-sen, see Harold Z. Schifflin, Sun Yat-sen 
and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968) and Martin C. Wilbur, Sun Yat-sen, Frustrated 
Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). 
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was elected its leader. Many of the triad members then came to support the 
Protect the Emperor Society, taking local support away from Sun Yat-sen. 
Sun sent Liang an angry letter, charging him with betraying an agreement 
between them before Liang's trip to Hawaii. Liang's response could be seen 
as indicative of his typical wavering or as political coalition-making. He 
replied that his political approach was a multifaceted one, essential for the 
rapidly changing circumstances. He asserted that the ideal of popular 
government could be attained by capitalizing on the current fervor over 
the controversy surrounding the Empress-Dowager's choice of an heir-
apparent for the Emperor. He even assured Sun that in principle he still 
supported anti-Manchuism, characteristic of Sun's nationalist 
revolutionary approach, and urged him to be flexible and cooperative. 
Liang even proposed a plan wherein a popular uprising could be staged 
against the Empress-Dowager's regime in order to protect the emperor, and 
after overthrowing her faction, the ideal of republicanism could be realized 
by electing the emperor president!20 For Liang, the exact form of 
government was not a matter of principle but of expediency. Not only 
does this episode point to Liang's flexibility in approach, one could say, but 
it also exemplifies the fact that, in his mind, democracy was not the most 
important characteristic of reform. Democracy was so strongly associated 
with political modernity that it sometimes seemed that superficial 
democratic methods were sought only to make China appear modern; if 
true democratic methods were unable to strengthen China at a particular 
20chang 139-140. 
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moment, other more effective means were readily considered by Liang and 
other reformers and revolutionaries of the time. 
In his historical analyses, however, Liang would not label an event 
democratic simply for the convenience of citing an historical precedent. In 
1901, referring to the sage-kings of Chinese antiquity, he wrote: 
The abdications of Yao and Shun are the premier instances of 
generous action in Chinese history. It is not only the standard old 
scholarship which unites to praise them. Thus, the modern 
"people's rights," "great harmony" group, too, does not fail to cite 
Yao and Shun to prove that China had a democratic system in 
antiquity. Their intent cannot but be called laudable. [Yet] I 
consider democracy to be a world universal principle. Where 
universal principles are concerned, one must not consider as a 
matter of any importance whether or not the ancients previously 
applied it. Thus, the abdications of Yao and Shun actually have no 
bearing on the modern doctrine. That is, even if Yao and Shun 
really did abdicate, that still is entirely different from modern 
democracy.21 
As contrived as Liang's proposal for electing the emperor may 
sound, it was true that Liang and some of his associates were coordinating 
a popular uprising in the name of protecting the emperor, resulting in the 
short-lived Hankou uprising of 1900. One of Liang's co-conspirators was in 
contact with Sun and his revolutionist group and hoped to coordinate 
revolts in the Yangtze Valley with those of Sun's group in southern 
Guangdong province.22 This shows that although Liang generally 
advocated gradual change through reforms, he occasionally took part in 
more radical activities. And even though Liang's actions sometimes 




government, this was due to his impatience to see some kind of reform for 
China. If not appropriate at the immediate time, democracy remained 
important in Liang's vision of a modern China in the future. 
Liang's New Citizen 
In 1902, Liang began writing his most influential journal, New 
Citizen (Xinm{n Shuo). This series of articles, mostly written before his 
travels in the United States in 1903, display his vision for the development 
of a strong China. 
The title, XTnm{n Shuo, is significant. The term xTnm{n (literally, 
new people) is a central term from one of the Confucian classics, the Great 
Learning, connoting that the basis of Confucian statesmanship rests in 
moral education and renovation of people. This traditional concept 
certainly underlay Liang's thinking, and he reinterpreted it to fit the 
requirements of the current time.23 He wrote: 
By xTnmfn, I do not mean to suggest a distinction between a new 
person and the one who makes him new. Instead, I mean for each 
of our people to renovate himself ... He who cleanses himself of the 
contaminating filth of the past is said to be renovating himself 
(ztxzn). Those who can rid themselves of the contaminating 
society of the past are called new citizens ( xfnmfn). 24 
In his Xfnmfn Shuo, Liang wrote of the new moral and personal 
characteristics that a renovated Chinese people, new citizens, would need 




Liang' s theory of China's new citizens and the state also had a strong 
Western influence, specifically drawn from social Darwinism. Liang 
defined the state as an organic whole composed of its citizens, and it is the 
quality of the citizens that will make up the quality of the state. Liang 
wrote: 
If there are new people (xTnmu1), we do not worry that there is no 
new institution, new government, or new state. The state is 
formed by an aggregation of the people. The people in the state are 
like the four limbs of the body. (Therefore if) you wish to achieve 
security, wealth, and prosperity, then (you) cannot but teach the 
way of new people.25 
Therefore, the people must be renewed and strengthened in order to build 
a strong state. 
One of the most important concepts that formed the foundation for 
Liang's definition of a new citizen is that of qfin, or unity. Liang contended 
that it is the essence of morality to strengthen group cohesion and to 
promote group interest.26 This idea is intertwined with that of 
nationalism, a major theme of most Chinese reformists and 
revolutionaries of the time; indeed Liang is viewed historically as one of 
the first to arouse modern Chinese nationalism. Liang's concept of qCin 
holds both modern and traditional characteristics; while traditional 
Chinese political culture holds that group interests have primacy over 
individual interests, Liang gives his own interpretation a non-traditional 
25Tim Sung Wook Shin, The Concepts of State (Kuo-Chia) and People 
(Min) in the Late Ch'ing, 1890-1907: The Case of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, T'an Ssu-
t'ung and Huang Tsun-hsien (Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, 
Berkeley, 1980) 119. 
26chang 151. 
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twist: that the specific interests and moral values of a group change over 
time and must evolve to meet the needs of current circumstances. Liang 
believed that the Confucian moral ethical standpoint of the ruler-subject 
relationship was miserably outdated and unsuited to withstanding the 
modern imperialism of the West. He wrote in the New Citizen: 
The motivating force (of modern international competition) stems 
from the citizenry's struggle for survival which is irrepressible 
according to the laws of natural selection and survival of the fittest. 
Therefore the current international competitions are not 
something which only concern the state, they concern the entire 
population .... The international competitions of the past which 
were the concerns of the rulers and their ministers would subside 
after a period. But the current international struggle will last 
forever because it is constantly a matter of concern for the life and 
property of the people.27 
Thus a united, nationalist citizenry is essential for the defense of China 
against Western imperialism. 
While Liang considered it the duty of the government and officials 
to educate the citizens, he also recognized the potential energy of the 
Chinese people. Liang wrote in The New Citizen: 
If we want to strengthen our nation, it is necessary to examine the 
way all other nations have achieved and to select eclectically the 
best things from them in order to correct our shortcomings ... (the) 
people's morality (mfnde), people's knowledge (m(nzhl) and 
people's energy (mfnlz) are the real sources of politics, scholarship 
and technology.28 
Liang's view of nationalism and citizenship can be examined 
through the term for citizenry, guo.mfn (literally, the nation's people). 




property of the people who make up the state. As Liang wrote in the New 
Citizen: 
The state is an aggregation of the people as a whole. If it is the 
people of a state who govern, legislate, and plan for the interest of 
the whole state and stave off the troubles which might afflict the 
state, the people then cannot be bullied and the state cannot be 
overthrown. This means citizenry.29 
Liang's definition of citizenry alludes to a democratic form of government 
as well as shows the importance he places on national unity for the 
purpose of saving China. Liang's definition of a modern citizenry 
contrasts that of the traditional definition of the ruler and subject; 
sovereignty rests in the people rather than in the ruler. 
However, it is necessary to distinguish between democracy and 
liberalism, for liberalism implies individualism, an orientation that Liang 
did not support. Liang did set forth his definition of liberty in the New 
Citizen, but it is necessary first to explain a problem of language. Liberty is 
one of those English words that does not have a direct equivalent in 
Chinese, and its closest translation carries a negative connotation instead 
of a positive one in the English sense. The Chinese term, zzybu, means "to 
act as one wishes," whereas the English term conveys the idea of freedom 
from bondage or arbitrary rule. Liang expressly defined liberty in the 
positive sense, writing that "liberty is a universal principle, a necessary 
condition of life, and is applicable everywhere. "30 He went on to say that 
the two most important aspects of liberty for China were popular 
29chang 164. 
30Huang 69. 
participation in government and national sovereignty.31 The 
strengthening of China as a nation is always of paramount importance. 
Before 1898, Liang had understood Western democratic ideas in 
29 
terms of the Mencian ideal of "primacy of the people." In Japan, after 
further study of Western and modern Japanese thought, he developed his 
ideas regarding the difference between the Mencian ideal and Western 
democracy, writing: 
Someone asks: 'Mencius is said to be the founding father of 
Chinese democracy. May I venture to ask whether the democracy 
of which Mencius spoke is the same as the democracy of which 
Western thinkers speak today?' I answer, 'It is different! It is 
different! The democracy of which Mencius spoke concerned 
protecting the people and caring for the people ... Protecting the 
people is to treat them as infants. Caring for the people is the same 
as tyranny in that it invades the people's right to liberty. The 
people prize their independence; they treasure their rights. They 
are not to be interfered with.'32 
It would be easy to mistake this quote of Liang' s as hi~ advocacy of 
individual rights and liberties, but it is clear from the preponderance of his 
other writings that his concept of rights does not refer to those of the 
individual against those of the state. In The New Citizen , Liang clarifies: 
Freedom means freedom of the group, not individual freedom. In 
the age of barbarism, individual freedom prevails and no collective 
freedom develops. In the civilized age, the freedom of the group 
develops while individual freedom decreases.33 
Freedom of the group refers to freedom from imperialist domination by 
outside groups. Individual freedom, Liang feared, could lead to social and 




political anarchy which would weaken the nation's stance against foreign 
incursions. 
That is not to say that Liang did not have any concern for 
individuals, for he was certainly concerned about the personal 
characteristics of China's new citizens. "Self-mastery means self-conquest 
and self-conquest means strength. With self-conquest and strength, how 
free one is!"34 But the purpose for cultivating these modern personal 
characteristics was for the collective good of the society and nation, not 
simply for the individual's own sake. He wrote in the Nez,u Citizen: 
The combination of fractions of rights will make up the right of a 
totality. All the individual senses of right will add up to a 
collective sense of rights of the whole nation. Thus cultivation of 
the sense of national right must start with the individual...The 
citizenry is an assemblage of individual citizens. The national 
right is the collection of individual rights ... The strong citizenry 
then make up a strong state; the weak citizenry make up a weak 
state; ... the citizenry in possession of rights makes up a state with 
national right...A citizenry without a sense of right, when 
confronted with foreign incursion, is like a withered tree in a 
storm.35 
The Later Years in Japan, 1903-1911: The Trip to America and After 
In early 1903, Liang made a trip to America which strongly affected 
his ideas for the direction of change for China. Liang's trip to the United 
States in 1903 shifted the emphasis in his thoughts about democracy. After 




years, Liang's direct observation of American society and overseas Chinese 
communities there left him disillusioned. 
Liang first of all observed that the people with the greatest ability did 
not take on leadership positions in politics, resulting in a predominance of 
mediocre presidents. Liang held critical views of a number of features of 
the American political system, such as the frequency of elections, which he 
saw as wasteful and corrupting, and the fact that the goal of many 
politicians was popularity rather than the solution to problems. He was 
awed by America's prosperity and dynamic economic growth but alarmed 
by Theodore Roosevelt's jingoistic speeches. 36 These observations served 
to strengthen his concern for China's stance against imperialism and his 
belief that the unity of citizens was necessary for China's survival. 
His observation of American Chinese communities, discovering 
that they had not progressed politically even though they existed under a 
more advanced political system, heightened his pessimism toward the 
ability of Chinese people to govern themselves in the near future. While 
the Chinatown in San Francisco published a number of newspapers and 
journals, evidence of a relatively high rate of literacy, Liang saw the 
community as plagued by corruption, infighting, inefficiency, and poverty 
and concluded that the Chinese people "were simply not ready for 
democracy. "37 Liang sadly wrote: 
Freedom, constitutionalism, republicanism: these are but the 
general terms which describe majority rule. But China's majority, 
the great, the vast majority of Chinese, are as I have described them 
36chang 239-244; Levenson 69-76. 
37Huang 79. 
here. Were we now to resort to rule by this majority, it would be 
the same as committing national suicide. Freedom, 
constitutionalism, republicanism -- this would be like wearing 
summer garb in winter, or furs in summer: beautiful, to be sure, 
but unsuitable. No more am I dizzy with vain imaginings; no 
longer will I tell a tale of pretty dreams. In a word, the Chinese 
people must for now accept authoritarian rule; they cannot enjoy 
freedom ... Those born in the thundering tempests of today, forged 
and molded by iron and fire -- they will be my citizens, twenty or 
thirty, nay, fifty years hence. Then we will give them Rousseau to 
read and speak to them of Washington. 38 
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After his return, Liang wrote in The New Citizen that "for years I 
have been intoxicated with the idea of a republic ... (but) all my life I have 
challenged received opinion, so I am not afraid now to challenge my 
former self."39 
Enlightened Despotism 
Liang had tentatively believed that a constitutional monarchy could 
work in China, but after his trip to the U. S., he came to doubt that the 
population possessed an adequate level of education and political 
experience for its implementation. He also noted that China lacked the 
institutional background, such as a clearly defined judicial system. He 
refuted his acceptance of constitutional monarchism in his long article of 
1905, "On Enlightened Despotism." 
Liang came to see a need for temporary autocratic leadership in 
China due to "internal conflicts" of "small groups" which could 
undermine the general good of society. Previously, he had believed that 
38Nathan, Chinese Democracy 60. 
39Nathan, Chinese Democracy 61. 
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individual interests and those of the whole society would naturally 
coincide, but now he believed instead that internal individual competition 
necessitated a strong government to impose order and solidarity. Order 
and solidarity, of course, was essential for a nation's ability to face external, 
or international, competition.40 In defending authoritarian rule that is 
enlightened, Liang wrote that "even if a governmental system nearly robs 
the people of the bulk or all of their liberty, it is a good system provided 
that it is founded on the spirit of meeting the exigencies of national 
defense."41 After a period of education under strong rule, an educated 
citizenry would achieve a higher civic consciousness in which their 
individual interests would automatically coincide with those of the state.42 
Clearly again, the form of government was less important than its 
nationalistic purpose. Once democracy lost its potential for strengthening 
China, Liang was ready to redefine it or put it off indefinitely for a time 
when China achieved strength and modernity. 
National survival and domestic harmony would be the top concerns 
of Liang's enlightened despot.43 He now proposed that enlightened 
despotism (kiiimu1g zhuangzhz) with a consultative assembly should be 
established as a transitional and preparatory phase to a representative 
constitutional system. Liang reasoned that the important criterion of 
government was not unchecked power but whether the government was 
enlightened; that an enlightened monarchical despotism was far more 
40chang 251-254. 
41Huang 82. 
42Nathan, Chinese Democracy 62. 
43ttuang 99. 
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desirable than a democratic despotism.44 He seemed to temporarily 
abandon even his most modest advocacy for democratic systems, but later 
he would revise his stance once again to campaign for the constitutionalist 
movement begun in 1906. 
Liang's views on nationalism were moderated at this time also. 
While many Chinese reformers and revolutionaries tended towards anti-
Manchu nationalism, especially Sun Yat-sen's followers, Liang saw the 
long-term potential for China's fragmentation if this narrow definition of 
nationalism was followed. Earlier, Liang was not clear in his ethnic 
definition of nationalism, but true to his concern for China as a whole, 
now he clearly stated his advocacy of a "broad nationalism" that would 
unite China's ethnic minorities against imperialist aggression.45 
The Constitutional Movement 
After 1903, the topics of Liang's writings covered more concrete 
issues, such as finance and constitutional law.46 Increasingly, Liang 
seemed to envision himself taking on a more concrete role in political 
leadership. When the Qing government announced plans to study the 
formation of a constitutional monarchy in 1906, looking to Japan as a 
model for modernization after that nation's surprising victory over Russia 
in Manchuria, Liang established an organization that would express 
44Frank Fe Wong, Liang Ch'i-'ch'ao and the Conflict of Confucian and 
Constitutional Politics (Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 





popular sentiments and educate the people politically in preparation for 
constitutional government. He did not take an official position in the 
organization as he was still on the wanted list of the Qing court, so he 
sought the support of leading Han and Manchu officials and of prominent 
local gentry. The organization was established in Tokyo in 1907 under the 
name Political Information Society (Zhengwen She).47 
The organization's espoused purpose was to work for a rapid 
transition to constitutional government through peaceful and orderly 
means. Its constitution called for the early convening of a national 
legislative body and the institution of responsible government, the 
establishment of the "rule of law" and the independence of the judiciary, 
the development of local self-government, and the equality of China with 
foreign nations. An undeclared purpose, in Liang's mind, was to counter 
the growing influence and activities of the more radical revolutionaries.48 
He hoped that this new organization could bring together reformers of 
more moderate opinions. 
Within a few months, the Political Information Society 
headquarters were moved to Shanghai, and the society focused on 
coordinating the most recently established constitutional associations and 
submitting petitions to the court urging the prompt convening of a 
parliament. Liang once again reaffirmed his belief in the positive 
renovating energy of the people, writing in 1908: 
47Huang 104. 
48Huang 105. 
Our country's people may say, right now the word from the 
emperor about setting up the constitution has already been 
pronounced several times. The responsibility is the 
government's ... the so-called supervisory system trickles down to 
me. I'd rather wait than pursue ... Personally I would say that this 
attitude is very stupid (Wu qie wei wei c1 yanzhe q{ bii zhz yz yz 
shen yz). No matter how strong the words from the government, 
they might not be honest. Also we don't know when they will put 
it into practice. Even if they're honest, they may not act soon. And 
if the driving force is from the government and not the people, 
then the result will be insignificant...Government and the people 
have a very close relationship. The people's supervision of the 
government cannot be lackadaisical or the government will do as it 
pleases. In this way (with the supervision of the people), good 
politics will occur.49 
36 
Though Liang writes of the people's role as supervisors of the government, 
he still regards constitutionalism as a way to strengthen the government by 
stating that the emperor can benefit from a constitution. 
Whether this is regarded as a conflict between or syncretism of 
Confucian politics and western constitutionalism is a .matter of debate. It 
has been asserted that Liang tended to see the writing of a constitution as a 
western method for carrying out traditional Chinese principles. In the 
Mencian tradition, the ruler was held responsible for the welfare of the 
people, and in this regard constitutionalism was a western system for the 
implementation of this Chinese principle.SO 
Although the energy for reform is most vigorous from below and in 
this way reform is promoted in a democratic way, guidance and authority 
49Liang Qichao, "Zhengzhi Yu Renmin" (Politics and the People), Yinbing 
Shi Heji (The Complete Works from the Ice-Drinker's Studio) 3 (20) ; 17-
18. (My translation.) 
SOwong 37-38. 
still rested in the government. In 1912 after the establishment of the 
Republic, Liang wrote: 
The main purpose of constitutional government is to achieve a 
compromise and reconciliation of contending forces. There are 
three primary areas of government where this reconciliation must 
be accomplished: 1. reconciliation of national sovereignty with 
people's rights 2. reconciliation of executive power with legislative 
power 3. reconciliation of the central government with provincial 
government.51 
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Liang hoped for orderly change as the purpose of reform or revolution 
remained the salvation of China in the imperialist world, and for this 
reason he believed in a strong central government, as his preamble to the 
1912 draft constitution of the Progressive Party shows: 
The Republic of China shall be unified forever and its sovereignty 
shall be exercised by such organizations as are prescribed by this 
constitution ... The sovereignty of the Republic is vested in the state 
(central government) and is not vested in the people.52 
Throughout his career, Liang's critics accused him of inconsistency and 
opportunism. In fact, he agreed, writing of himself that he "had too few 
convictions (and) would often be carried away by events and abandon 
positions he had held."53 A more sympathetic view would be that he 
always hoped to "do as much as possible within existing circumstances."54 
Unfortunately for Liang, one of the petitions of the Political 
Information Society proved to be too radical for the court even to consider. 
Kang Y ouwei, working with Liang and the society behind the scenes, 
drafted a petition signed by his followers that proposed the immediate 
Slwong 201. 
52wong 206. 
53Nathan, Chinese Democracy 48. 
54Huang 4. 
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convening of parliament and implementation of constitutional 
government, the ousting of all eunuchs, eradicating Manchu-Han 
differences, and moving the capital to south of the Yangtze River.SS In 
short order, imperial decree banned the Political Information Society and 
demanded the arrest and punishment of its members. Since the original 
goal was to be a legitimate organization working for reform within the 
system, the now-outlawed society fell apart. 
Liang then tried working with other domestic-based constitutional 
groups. Provincial assemblies were established in late 1909, and they soon 
called for a national congress in order to speed the establishment of 
constitutional government. They gathered in Shanghai and sent 33 
representatives to Beijing to petition for the timely founding of a 
parliament. After a number of petitions, initial refusal and later 
compromise by the court, Liang and the provincial leaders established the 
Society of the Friends of Constitutional Government (Xianyou Huz) in 
early 1911 with branches in nearly all provinces and membership of their 
top provincial leaders. Perhaps inclusive of too many disparate views and 
ambitions, this society too disintegrated with the onset of the revolution 
later that year. 
While Liang had been advocating moderate reform during the past 
five years, he was nonetheless thickly involved with assorted 
revolutionaries during the Qing overthrow in 1911-12, primarily out of a 
55Huang 106-107. 
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concern for preventing political disintegration and foreign intervention.56 
Liang and a few of his associates attempted to coordinate a constitutional 
monarchy following the Wuchang uprising of 1911, but Kang and Liang as 
well as the various provincial constitutionalists were not unified.57 In the 
end, the military strength of Yuan Shikai and his Beiyang Army proved to 
possess the strongest power base, took control, and a republic was 
established. 58 
Liang' s Political Activities in Republican China: 1912-1919 
Although Yuan Shikai effectively based his rule on his military 
power, he still needed significant support from the intellectual elite. The 
revolutionary intellectual leaders intended to establish a republic, and a 
constitutional government was meant to provide a basis for unifying 
regional factions. Liang understandably felt that he had a role to play in 
the new government, confiding to his brother in 1909 that he felt there 
could be "no hope for China's future" unless he "returned to take the reins 
56Ernest P. Young, "The Reformer as a Conspirator: Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and 
the 1911 Revolution." Approaches to Modern Chinese History. Ed. Albert 
Feuerwerker, Rhoads Murphy, and Mary C. Wright (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1967). 
57Huang 109-110. 
58For further reading on the early Republic, see K.S. Liew, Struggle for 
Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971); Ernest Young, The Presidency of 
Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977); George T. Yu, Party 
Politics in Republican China: The Kuomintang, 1912-1924 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966); Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in 
China, 1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). 
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of government. "59 However, Liang lacked a significant and organized base 
of support of his own. 
At the urging of some of his closest followers, Liang decided to ally 
himself with Yuan, reasoning that if he worked with the strongest power, 
he could have the most decisive influence. He apparently seemed to hope 
that Yuan could be fashioned into his ideal of an "enlightened despot," for 
by the early spring of 1912, he was addressing Yuan in his letters as 
"enlightened ruler."60 Yuan seemed to appreciate having on his side 
Liang's prestige as well as his practical advice on law and finance and upon 
Liang's return to China in November 1912, Yuan awarded him a monthly 
stipend and an additional sum for a moderate conglomerate party that 
Liang was working to establish.61 
In fact, when Liang returned to China in late 1912, he was still at the 
height of his popularity and his support was highly sought after by many 
groups. However widely respected he remained, his real influence on the 
already existing and competing power centers was limited by a lack of 
organizational unity. Liang joined the newly formed Progressive Party 
(Jznbil Dang), a merger of earlier parties62, but was only one of its nine 
executive members.63 
Liang's political stance at this time can be seen in a speech he gave in 
the spring of 1913. He rejected the methods of Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist 
59Huang 117. 
60H uang 118-119. 
61Huang 120. 
62For the amalgamation, see Levenson's footnotes on pages 174 and 188. 
63Huang 121. 
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Party (calling it a "rowdy party"), worried about the dangers of "mob rule" 
and "anarchy," and emphasized the necessity of working within existing 
possibilities. As for Yuan Shikai, Liang said that although "our party is not 
satisfied with a single measure of the Provisional Government, ... we force 
ourselves to support this government... in order to await the formation of 
a permanent government and to attempt gradually to reform the 
government." His central purpose would be to "calmly and watchfully 
supervise" the government.64 This pragmatic stance is consistent with his 
views since 1903, viewing democracy and his "new citizenry" as a distant 
ideal; current circumstances demanded a strong central government that 
would gradually undergo reforms and lead to representative government. 
After the weakening of the Nationalist (Guomfndang) majority in 
the legislature following the assassination of its leader in 1913, the 
Progressive Party was able to appoint a number of its prominent members 
to high cabinet posts, including Liang as Minister of Justice. In this 
position, Liang attempted to confirm the rule of law by establishing the 
independence of the judicial branch of government. Liang posited that "to 
cultivate the rule of law," it was essential to instill in everyone the ·"respect 
for the law" that could only be earned by its independence from 
interference from military authorities.65 Liang moved not to completely 
rebuild a new judiciary nor to revert to the old system but instead to 




Liang, however, did not get very far in his work with the judiciary. 
Several months later, the day after the committee drafting the constitution 
presented its work, Yuan ordered the dissolution of the Guomindang and 
two months later, January 10, 1914 formally dissolved the legislature. He 
announced a revised constitution on May 1, giving himself dictatorial 
powers. Liang, thus, was rendered powerless, but Yuan wanted to keep 
Liang involved in his government, appointing him to head the Bureau of 
Currency. 
Liang had not had much hope in the legislature before its 
dissolution, as it could not seem to rise above factional struggles. Now he 
was even more disheartened but nonetheless forged ahead in his new 
financial post, attempting to make whatever progress could possibly be 
made. Here, too, however, Liang found that he could not overcome 
entrenched interests to enact the reforms he desired, and left his post in the 
Bureau of Currency at the end of the year. Six months later, Yuan 
persuaded him to join a new committee for drafting a constitution, but 
Liang nervously moved to Tianjin as Yuan was hinting at restoring the 
monarchy with himself as emperor.66 Liang was actively involved with 
provincially-based anti-monarchists67, but when Yuan died on June 6, 
1916, his monarchist movement also expired and a few months later the 
legislature was reconvened under the Provisional Constitution of 1912. 
Though Liang was aware of the failure of his earlier efforts in 




failure of Yuan's monarchical movement renewed fresh hope that 
progress in constitutional government could finally be made. 68 
Unfortunately, however, partisan strife in the legislature continued, and 
the elections of 1918 proved the weakness of China's constitutional system. 
Liang had no real power to make changes; the force of persuasion was not 
enough without military power. As China slid quickly into a period of 
warlordism, Liang withdrew from politics in 1919 and devoted his efforts 
to education and scholarship until his death in 1929. 
Liang's political beliefs wavered, over the course of his lifetime, 
between reform and revolution as well as democratic and authoritarian 
methods, but he was consistently committed to social progress for China. 
As Liang' s prescription for strengthening China evolved over time and 
was always tailored to meet the needs of current circumstances, so was his 
definition of democracy. He was inconsistent in his ideas for specific 
democratic forms that would ensure the people's role in the government, 
but he firmly believed in modern democratic ideals of popular education 
and political participation. Liang was dedicated to the political 
modernization of China, and his definition of democracy remained under 





Hu Shi was born in 1891 in Shanghai, the youngest son of a minor 
official in the Qing dynasty. His early home life was somewhat unsettled 
due to his family circumstances. His mother was his father's much 
younger third wife (the previous two had died); when Hu Shi was born, 
his mother was only 18 and his father was 50.1 When Hu' s father died in 
1895, his young mother was left to depend on the stepsons by her late 
husband's second marriage for her own and her young child's support. 
The family earned their living by running small businesses in Shanghai 
and Hankou and, while Hu Shi's childhood was not spent in poverty, he 
did grow up in an atmosphere of financial and family tension.2 Even so, 
both of Hu' s parents had a strong positive influence on him; though his 
father died when Hu was not yet four, Hu was left with his father's books 
and writings.3 And under the difficult domestic circumstances of his 
youth, it is understandable that the mother-son relationship was a strong 
one. While his personal aspirations sometimes conflicted with his duty 
1 Jerome B. Grieder, Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in 
the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1970) 7. 
2Grieder, Hu Shih 8-10. 
3For his father's writings and commitment to the rational humanism of 
Song Dynasty (960-1279) Neo-Confucianism and that influence on Hu Shi, 
see Greider, Hu Shih 13-17, 19. 
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towards his mother4, he often wrote affectionately and sentimentally about 
her later in life. He remembered her as embodying the traditional virtues 
of the Chinese wife and mother: modesty, integrity, forbearance -- "my 
mother's greatest gift," Hu stated5, and a strong sense of responsibility 
towards her husband's family. He wrote in his autobiography that his 
mother "was able to endure only because she had in me a bit of her own 
flesh and blood to sustain her. She entrusted all her aspirations to my 
remote and unfathomable future."6 
Hu Shi's future would be one of superb achievement, earning him 
national and international esteem, even though many of his aspirations 
for China remained unfulfilled. In examining Hu's ideas on democracy, 
this chapter will first explore his educational experiences and then will 
concentrate on his activities and writings from the time he returned to 
4Most notably the circumstances of his arranged marriage to an 
uneducated woman from his father's ancestral village. See Greider, Hu 
Shih 11-12, 351-354 and Chou Min-Chih, Hu Shih and Intellectual Choice 
in Modern China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984) 58-
80 ... After much soul-searching, he eventually gave in, saying, "If we are to 
lead we must obey the old conventions ... Ours is an intermediate 
generation which must be sacrificed both to our parents and to our 
children. Unless we would lose all influence, we must marry as our 
parents wish, girls selected by them for us, whom we may not see before 
our wedding day -- and we must make society happier and healthier for 
our children to live in. Let that be our reward and consolation." Lewis 
Gannett, "Hu Shih: Young Prophet of Young China," The New York 
Times Magazine (March 27, 1927) 10. The second main issue that troubled 
Hu regarding his mother was her devotion to Buddhism, which Hu 
considered superstitious and unscientific. 
5Hu Shih, "Untitled Essay." In Living Philosophies (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1931) 238. 
6Grieder, Hu Shih 10-11. 
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China in 1917 until he left China, almost permanently, in 1937 as the war 
with Japan consumed all thoughts and energies of China. 
Hu Shi' s Early Studies 
A component of Hu's early learning that would have great 
importance for his later fame was his introduction to vernacular fiction. 
While serious Confucian scholars held the writing of classical poetry a 
worthy pursuit, they considered reading or writing vernacular fiction, 
especially novels, disreputable and immoral because they entertained 
themes of romance, intrigue, and even eroticism. However, many literate 
Chinese secretly spiced up their reading time with popular novels or short 
stories, and Hu Shi's family was no exception. Hu accidentally found a 
worn portion of The Water Margin at his uncle's house and instantly 
became hooked on Ming (1368-1644) and Qing dynasty fiction. "From that 
time on I devoured every novel known in our community and in the 
near-by villages. "
7 
Some years later, as a leader of the literary revolution 
in 1917, Hu recalled his experiences translating the archaic prose into the 
colloquial language when he read these stories to the women of the 
household as they did their sewing. 8 
It was Hu's mother who oversaw his education when he was a 
young boy, insisting, as his father had before, that his teachers explain the 
meaning of the texts he studied rather than only requiring the customary 
7 Hu, Living Philosophies 243. 
8Grieder, Hu Shih 19-20. 
method of rote memorization. 9 Notwithstanding her respect for 
traditional Chinese values, she encouraged Hu to seek a "modern" 
d . . Sh h . 10 e uca hon m ang ai. 
Studies In Shanghai, 1904-1910 
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Hu Shi was only twelve in the spring of 1904 when he traveled to 
Shanghai, accompanying one of his half-brothers who needed treatment 
for tuberculosis, 
11 
"armed only with a mother's love, a habit of study, and 
a little tendency to doubt."
12 
He had been advised by his half-brothers that 
he should not waste his time on the classical curriculum to prepare for the 
civil service examinations since they were coming under increasing attack 
(the exams were abolished in 1905). So between 1904 and 1908, Hu Shi 
studied in schools where classical learning was supplemented by Western 
studies, such as English and mathematics. 
Shanghai at this time was rapidly changing from a port city 
concerned primarily with trade to a city of intellectual ferment. It was a 
center for the development of modern newspapers and political journals 
in China, as discussed in the previous chapter, and the prime spot for the 
smuggling of banned political journals (like Liang Qichao's New Citizen) 
into China by students returning from Japan or the West. Hu knew little 
of international affairs or China's place in them before his arrival in 
9Chou 3. 
lOGrieder, Hu Shih 13. 
11Chou 5. 
l2Hu, Living Philosophies 246. 
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Shanghai, but he quickly absorbed the all-encompassing importance of 
current events into his studies. 
Hu's introduction to Western ideas, including democratic ones, 
came in several forms, both in his school life and in his outside reading. 
He read Yan Fu's translations of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics, Mill's 0 n 
Liberty, and Montesquieu's Defense of the Spirit of the Laws, and while Hu 
complained that Yan's classical writing style was "too refined,"13 the 
impact of the ideas presented in these books on the intellectual philosophy 
of revolutionary China was, as noted in the introductory chapter, immense 
and long-lasting. Hu later wrote: 
In the course of a few years many of the evolutionary terms and 
phrases became proverbial expressions in the journalistic writings 
of the time. Numerous persons adopted them in naming 
themselves and their children, thereby reminding themselves of 
the perils of elimination in the struggle for existence, national as 
well as individual...Two of my schoolmates bore the names 
"Natural Selection Yang" and "Struggle for Existence Sun" ... Even 
my own name bears witness to the great vogue of evolutionism in 
China. I remember distinctly the morning when I asked my second 
brother to suggest a literary name for me. After only a moment's 
reflection, he said, "How about the word shz (fitness) in the phrase 
'Survival of the Fittest'?" I agreed and, first using it as a nom de 
plume, finally adopted it in 1910 as my name.14 
As a way of looking at China's present condition, evolutionary ideas were 
intricately bound with China's conception of progress and modernity. 
Evolutionary ideas had a profound and enduring effect on Hu's ideas 
throughout his life. 
l3Grieder, Hu Shih 26. 
14Hu, Living Philosophies 248. 
Like all young intellectuals of the time, Hu read Liang Qichao's 
contraband journals. Of these readings, Hu wrote years later in his 
autobiography: 
It was those essays (Liang's essays and biographical accounts of 
European thinkers in the New Citizen) which first violently 
shocked me out of the comfortable dream that our ancient 
civilization was self-sufficient and had nothing to learn from the 
militant and materialistic West except in the weapons of war and 
the vehicles of commerce. They opened to me, as to hundreds of 
others, an entirely new vision of the world. 15 
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Liang not only introduced Hu to Western ideas but also to a more 
diverse selection of Chinese philosophy than is usually given attention. 
Hu read Liang's summary of the history of Chinese thought, General 
Circumstances of the Development of Chinese Scholarship, and noted that 
it was this which "caused me to know that China had learning beyond 
(that found in) the Four Books and the Five Classics."16 
Hu Shi studied in three different schools during his time in 
Shanghai. In 1906 he entered the China National Institute (Zhongguo 
Gongxue), the third and most radical of the schools he attended. The 
Institute had just been founded that year by a group of students who 
returned from Japan in protest against that government's curtailment of 
their revolutionary activities there. 17 The student body included a mixture 
of students from the Chinese interior, not yet feeling the impact of the 
15Hu, Living Philosophies 247. 
16chou 11. 
17
Description of the China National Institute in Grieder, Hu Shih 24-26, 
and in his Intellectuals and the State in Modern China (New York: The 
Free Press, 1981) 153-154. 
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revolutionary times and still dressed in traditional scholar's robes, and 
many students just returned from abroad, wearing Western or Japanese 
attire and having cut off their queues in protest against Manchu rule. The 
founding of the Institute provided that the student body would elect from 
their own number students to serve in the administration, and during 
their terms they would be responsible to a council of student 
representatives. Hu served as the secretary of the student association. 
Hu not only read and studied while he lived in Shanghai but was an 
active, if not radical, 18 participant in the stimulating atmosphere of the 
time. He and a group of students from the China National Institute wrote 
for a small newspaper, established in 1906, they called The Struggle (J~ngy~ 
Xunbao). Like many other small papers of the time, The Struggle was 
mainly written in the vernacular for the purpose of "instilling new ideas 
into the uneducated masses."19 While an unspoken function was to 
promote revolutionary political agitation, the expressed aim of the paper 
was "to stimulate education, promote popular spirit, improve society and 
advocate political independence."20 Hu seems to have held to these 
principles in his contributions for the paper, writing essays against 
superstition, advocating critical thinking, and reflecting that "my editorial 
work on this magazine helped me ... develop an ability in the use of the 
living tongue as a literary medium. "21 These goals and Hu' s response to 
18Chou 17-18. 
19Hu Living Philosophies, 249. 
20Grieder, Hu Shih 29. 
21 Hu, Living Philosophies 249. 
them foreshadow the deepening definition of modernity as something 
more than the strengthening of the nation in a political sense but as a 
process that includes social and cultural change. 
Sl 
At about the same time that the China National Institute began 
having financial difficulties in 1908, so did Hu's family. When some of the 
more radical students broke from the school and opened a New China 
National Institute, Hu did not re-enroll but, due to his personal financial 
circumstances, instead taught English there. When the branch school re-
merged with the original Institute, Hu found a position at a different 
public school teaching English and Chinese, supplementing his income 
with private English lessons. 22 This was not a positive period for Hu. He 
became immersed in the dispirited mood of his revolutionary friends and 
spent many nights drinking, gambling, and engaging in other vices offered 
by the city. "Those years (1909-1910) were dark years in the history of China 
as well as in my personal history ... Despondency and drudgery drove us to 
all kinds of dissipation," Hu reflected.23 After a drunken scrape with the 
police one evening which landed him in jail for the night, Hu awoke the 
next day and, seeing his bruised reflection in the mirror, resolved to set 
himself straight. With financial help from relatives and friends, he 
managed to set aside a two-month period of study solely to prepare for the 
Boxer Indemnity scholarship examinations.24 
22Grieder, Hu Shih 34. 
23Hu, Living Philosophies 250. 
24Grieder, Hu Shih 35. The Boxer Indemnity scholarship, that sponsored 
Chinese students' university education in the United States, was 
established by the U. S. government with funds from its share of the 
52 
The examinations were rigorous, but Hu was one of 70 who passed. 
Six transformative years in Shanghai changed him from a pre-teen, 
accustomed to the company of his mother and aunts, into a mature youth, 
with notions of China's needs for modernization and enough Western 
training to win a scholarship for study in America. At the age of nineteen, 
he embarked for the United States. 
Studying in the United States, 1910-1917 
In September of 1910, Hu Shi enrolled in the College of Agriculture 
at Cornell University conceding to "the belief, then current in China, that a 
Chinese student must learn some useful art, and literature and philosophy 
were not considered of any practical use."25 But the topics of biology and 
botany were uninspiring to him, and after a year and a half of indifferent 
study and mediocre results, Hu transferred to the College of Arts and 
Sciences, changing his major to philosophy. Though he felt much more at 
home in this field, he seemed to feel some need to justify his move, 
writing a few years later in retrospect: 
Many things are necessary for the salvation of the nation, and 
which of them ought not be undertaken? But I am by nature 
suited for only one or two things .. .I changed my occupation, and 
again argued points of scholarship and politics .. .In order to solve 
the difficulties of the times, study must be appropriate to the times. 
indemnity China had to pay after the Boxer uprising of 1900. See Michael 
H. Hunt, "The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A 
Reappraisal," Journal of Asian Studies 31: 3 (May 1972): 539-559. 
25Hu, Living Philosophies 252. 
Who at present can question the appropriateness of an age of 
flourishing literature?26 
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Hu studied diligently, earning his B.A. degree in February 1914. In 
the fall of that year he continued his study of philosophy as a graduate 
student. Upon learning of John Dewey's experimentalist philosophy at 
Columbia University, Hu transferred there in 1915 to study under his 
guidance. 
Hu Shi' s Philosophical Orientation 
Hu Shi had a "tendency to doubt" at an early age, and as early as 
January 1914, he wrote in his diary that he was searching for a "practical 
philosophy."27 He found it in John Dewey's experimentalism. Dewey's 
approach to philosophy coincided with Hu's previous inclination to study 
problems using "pragmatic" standards of judgment. 
The first experimentalist idea which attracted him was the 
definition of Truth as a relative value, having meaning only in specific 
judgments and always open to re-evaluation due to new experience. The 
second related concept that appealed to Hu was the scientific methodology 
that is inherent in experimentalism's analysis of social and intellectual 
problems.28 Certainly Hu was attracted by experimentalism's universal 
appeal and utility; because it was "scientific," it was not Western but 
transcended culture. This method of thinking did not necessitate the 
26Grieder, Hu Shih 41-42. 
27 Greider, Hu Shih 47. 
28Greider, Hu Shih 47. 
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complete negation of Chinese tradition but did prescribe a re-evaluation of 
Chinese history and tradition, in Hu' s understanding, allowing a 
"modern" scientific critical re-appraisal of Chinese culture and traditions. 
Years earlier in Shanghai, Hu had written through the words of a character 
in his novel, The Island of Unchanging Reality: 
We can only regret that we Chinese have never been willing to 
think, and only know how to conform, without holding opinions 
of our own. That our countrymen have come to their present pass 
is, in my view, simply the result of this unwillingness to think. So 
the great Confucian scholar of the Song, Cheng Yi, said, "Learning 
originates in thought," and these four words are certainly the 
expression of an imperishable truth. 29 
This passage shows that early on, Hu had rejected conformity, a tendency 
that intellectuals of his generation criticized as a negative inheritance of 
China's traditional culture, in favor of critical thinking and valued its 
importance for the modern development of China. 
Hu was also attracted by the idea of progress that he perceived in 
Dewey's philosophy. In January 1914, before studying under Dewey, he 
wrote: 
What our country urgently needs today is not novel theories or 
abstruse philosophical doctrines, but the methods (shu) by means 
of which knowledge may be sought, affairs discussed, things 
examined and the country governed. Speaking from my own 
experience, there are three methods which are miraculous 
prescriptions to restore life (qzsz shendiin): 
1. the principle of inductive reasoning 
2. a sense of historical perspective 
3. the concept of progress30 
29Greider, Hu Shih 48. 
30creider, Hu Shih 48-49. 
55 
Hu, therefore, was looking for methods with which to restore life to, or 
modernize, China. His practical philosophy for China incorporated the 
concept of progress, a sense of historical perspective, and the principle of 
inductive reasoning. This, for Hu, was the philosophical foundation of 
modernization. 
Hu Shi's Observation of American Political Life 
Just as Hu's involvement in the intellectual and political climate of 
Shanghai necessarily shaped the development of his ideas, so it was with 
Hu's time in the United States. While at Cornell University, he learned 
about American local government by attending meetings of the Ithaca 
Town Council, and for a course on American party politics he read every 
state's legislation on political corruption.31 During the 1912 presidential 
campaign, he subscribed to three New York newspapers, each supporting 
one of the three major candidates. After listening to a debate between 
Wilson and Roosevelt, Hu wrote in his diary: 
Wilson thought that the government's duty was to get rid of the 
obstacles to let the people live in freedom. This was what Wilson 
called "new freedom." Roosevelt thought the government was the 
supervisor of the people that supported, directed, and protected its 
people as if they were "newborn babies." Between Wilson and 
Roosevelt, I follow Wilson. 32 
It is interesting that Hu' s description of Roosevelt's political philosophy 
appears Confucian in its conception of government as supervisor and 
3 lGrieder, Hu Shih 52. 
32Yang Cheng-pin, The Political Thoughts of Dr. Hu Shih. Translated 
from Chinese. (Taipei, Taiwan: Bookman Books, 1986) 33. 
protector, and Hu rejected it. As evidence of Hu's pacifism and 
cosmopolitan outlook, Hu further wrote: 
Wilson is the type of idealist that is hard to find today. His political 
thinking can be regarded as the best product of the Wes tern 
civilization. He has managed both home and foreign affairs with 
morality. This is why I call it "of consistency." Consistency means 
that your words and your behaviors agree, in the past as at the 
present. It means to do to others what you want others to do to 
you ... And do not do to other countries or people what you do not 
want done to your own country and people. 33 
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While Hu had rejected Roosevelt's conception of government as 
supervisor, a view that coincided with Confucian political philosophy, he 
commended Wilson for his morality, another Confucian political value. 
During his years at Cornell, Hu was active in the Cornell 
Cosmopolitan Club between 1911 and 1914. At different times he held 
various positions: chairman of the resolutions committee, president, and 
delegate to an international congress of similar university clubs which 
simultaneously represented the Cornell Cosmopolitan Club and the 
Chinese Students' Alliance.34 The club's purpose was to discuss political 
affairs, exchange ideas, and render intellectual and moral judgments, but it 
did not aim to be directly involved in politics. Hu's political involvement 
as a student in these kinds of discussion groups reflects his belief in the 
correct nature of student activism. An entry in his diary in 1915, after 
hearing music coming from outside his dormitory room, illustrates Hu's 
opinion on direct political activism: 
33Yang 34. 
34chou 84-85. 
Going to the window I looked down and saw an automobile filled 
with women, all of them suffragettes. In their midst was a girl 
playing a flute in a manner melancholy enough to move one's 
heart. Slowly a crowd gathered. The flute stopped and the girl 
arose to invite the crowd to a rally that was to be held in front of 
the library. I went along too. A number of women made speeches, 
all of them quite good. Suddenly in the crowd I caught sight of 
Professor John Dewey ... the number one figure in philosophical 
circles in this country. I thought at first that he was perhaps only 
passing by, but when the speeches were over he ... got into the car 
and drove off with all the women ... and then I realized that the 
professor was helping them in their campaigning. Alas, a scholar 
of the twentieth century should not act thus!35 
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Hu did not consider public protest appropriate for an intellectual 
concerned with cultural and social regeneration, but he did consider it his 
place to make his views known on events in writing. For example, in the 
fall of 1914 at Cornell, a group of female students petitioned the university 
president to protest the residence of two black students in their dormitory. 
The president was planning to make segregated arrangements for the two 
when Hu sent a protest letter to the Cornell Daily Sun. The editor of the 
paper did not publish the letter but did, at Hu's insistence, forward the 
letter to the president. Largely due to Hu's letter, the president denied the 
. . f h h" d 36 petition o t e w 1te stu ents. 
Hu met many prominent speakers and writers through his activity 
in the Cornell Cosmopolitan Club. Hu even traveled to Washington, D.C. 
with a group of delegates and met Secretary of State Bryan and President 
Wilson, who told them, "I think that this little gathering represents one of 
the most promising things of modern life, namely, the intimate 
35Greider, Hu Shih 54. 
36Chou 86. 
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intercourse of men who are engaged in studying those things which have 
nothing to do with international boundaries but have only to do with the 
elevation of the mind and the spirit."37 
It was sentiments such as these which solidified Hu's sense of 
modern cosmopolitanism, pacifism and universal humanitarianism. 
These values contrasted with revolutionary nationalist fervor that he 
encountered in his years in Shanghai. Hu was a patriot and did believe 
that a sense of national identity was compatible with a cosmopolitan view; 
cosmopolitan~sm, Hu believed, "is patriotism balanced by a humane 
outlook. "38 Pacifism also accorded with his belief in reason to solve 
problems and to progress. Hu made a distinction between patriotism and 
nationalism. In October 1914, he wrote, "Patriotism is a fine thing but it 
must be understood that above the nation there exists a higher goal, above 
the nation there exists a greater community. As Goldwin Smith says, 
'Ab 11 . . h . "'39 ove a nations 1s umamty. 
Hu Shi and the Overseas Chinese Student Movement 
A critical event in 1915 tested Hu's commitment to pacifism: the 
infamous Twenty-One Demands submitted by Japan to the Chinese 
government, claiming a virtual protectorate over much of northeastern 
China. The event aroused widespread protests in the Chinese student 
37 Greider, Hu Shih 57. 
38chou 89. 
39chou 89. "Above all nations is humanity" was the motto of the Cornell 
Cosmopolitan Club. 
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population in America as well as among those in China. Hu' s reaction, 
however, was strikingly calm. His proposals ranged from advocating 
nonresistance to urging the just and swift execution of international law. 
He remarked, "My cosmopolitanism should first of all be aimed at Japan. 
This is called catching the ring-leader."40 He wrote an article titled "A Plea 
for Patriotic Sanity" for the Chinese Student Monthly in which he stated: 
I am afraid we have completely lost our heads, and have gone 
mad ... We are excited, nervous, nay patriotically insane. My 
Brethren, it is absolutely useless to get excited at such a critical 
moment. No excitement, nor high-sounding sentiments, nor 
sensational suggestions, have ever helped any nation. Talking of 
fighting "on paper" is the most shallow course for us to take, who 
call ourselves "students" and "capable men." It seems to me that 
the right course for us students to take at this moment and at this 
distance from China, is this: Let us be calm. Let us DO OUR DUTY 
which is TO STUDY .... Let us apply ourselves seriously, calmly, 
undisturbedly and unshakenly to our studies, and PREPARE 
OURSELVES to uplift our father-land ... So I say with all sincerity 
and with all devotion to China, that it is pure nonsense and 
foolishness to talk of fighting when there is not the slightest chance 
of gaining anything but devastation, and devastation, and 
devastation! ... Read this letter carefully before you condemn me.41 
Nevertheless, Hu was swiftly and sharply condemned. The editor of the 
Monthly printed an editorial in the same issue in which he criticized Hu's 
commitment to non-resistance as "rested on the wings (of?) philosophers' 
fancy and scholars' dreams."42 
Hu's reaction to the crisis may seem to indicate a less than adequate 
concern with Japanese aggression in China. However, he did write a sharp 
40chou 90. 
41Hu Shih, "A Plea for Patriotic Sanity: An Open Letter to All Chinese 
Students," The Chinese Students' Monthly 10:7 (April 1915): 425-426. 
42Greider, Hu Shih 62. 
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rebuttal to "A Friend of China" who wrote a letter to the editor of the New 
Republic stating that perhaps the Japanese might be taking a "responsible 
and effective direction of China's affairs" since "China is incapable of 
developing herself." Hu countered: 
In this twentieth century no nation can ever hope peacefully to 
rule over or to interfere with the internal administrative affairs of 
another nation ... The Chinese national consciousness has 
exterminated the Manchu rule, and I am sure, will always resent 
any foreign rule or "direction" ... the transformation of a vast nation 
like China cannot be accomplished in a day ... Every nation has the 
right to be left alone to work out its own salvation.43 
Still, many thought that Hu was too often lost in "philosopher's 
dreams" when dire crises demanded more direct, perhaps military, action. 
But Hu was convinced of the force of ideas in shaping events, and that 
people can control their environment by forging new social and political 
forms. This meant, for Hu, that social and cultural transformation is the 
foundation of progress and modernity, that modernization is a process of 
ideas. Because ideas are the basis for any action: 
Human tools and institutions had their origin in .. .ideas ... The 
civilization of a race is simply the sum-total of its achievement in 
adjusting itself to its environment. Success or failure in that 
adjustment depends upon the ability of the race to use intelligence 
for the invention of necessary and effective tools. Advancement in 
civilization depends upon the improvement of tools.44 
43Hu Shih, "Communications to American Editors on Japanese Demands: 
Letter to The New Republic," The Chinese Students' Monthly 10:6 (March 
1915) 389-390. 
44Hu Shih, "The Civilizations of East and West," in Charles A. Beard, ed. 
Whither Mankind: A Panorama of Modern Civilization. (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1928) 26-27. 
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Because tools were created by ideas, ideas had more strength than weapons 
of war, in Hu's thinking, even in times of national urgency. In late 1914 as 
the crisis with Japan was becoming more serious, Hu wrote in his diary: 
Certainly we cannot but respect the sentiments of those who at the 
present time desire to strengthen the military in order to save 
China from destruction, but this is unsurpassed stupidity ... What, 
then, is a fundamental plan? To make our education flourish, to 
release our forces of salvation (kaiwu d'izang), to promote our 
civilization, to bring order to our internal politics .. .In our foreign 
affairs we should give our strong support to humanism (rendao 
zhilyz), firmly denouncing, as individuals and as a nation, the 
unhuman and unchristian aggressivism of the West, and on the 
other hand advocating with all our might the doctrines of pacifism, 
and together with the United States exerting our strength to 
encourage international morality. Only with the progress of 
international morality can we really speak of progress for the 
world, and (only then can) our country begin to enjoy the blessings 
of peace. 
Critics will say that this is to talk of the far distant future, and has 
no immediate practicality ... How can I speak of the distant future? I 
d h . 45 cannot o ot erw1se. 
This attitude, of course, frustrated impatient revolutionaries of the time, 
but Hu was not to be swayed from these convictions. In 1915, he wrote a 
letter to an old friend in Shanghai: 
I believe that the proper way of creating causes at the present time 
lies in the cultivation of men (shuren ). This properly depends 
upon education. Therefore I have of late entertained no 
extravagant hopes, and after returning home I will seek only to 
devote myself to the task of social education ... believing this to be 
the only (possible) plan for the cultivation of men over a period of 
one hundred years .. .! have come to understand that there is no 
short-cut that can be effective in national or world affairs.
46 
45Greider, Hu Shih 67-68. 
46Greider, Hu Shih 70. 
62 
It is understandable that Hu Shi would be criticized by many activists for 
his gradual approach to reform, as had Liang Qichao at times. 
In late May 1917, after two years at Columbia University, Hu Shi 
successfully defended his doctoral dissertation, The Development of the 
Logical Method in Ancient China. His paper was an exploration of classical 
Chinese philosophy, particularly the heterodox schools, which was 
intended to reveal previously unrecognized use of "pragmatic" standards 
of judgment. 
Now that China has come into contact with the other thought-
systems of the world, it has seemed to some that the lack of 
methodology in modern Chinese philosophy can now be supplied 
by introducing into China the philosophical and scientific methods 
which have developed in the Western world from the time of 
Aristotle to this day .. .I have the strongest desire to make my own 
people see that these methods of the West are not totally alien to 
the Chinese mind, and that on the contrary, they are the 
instruments by means of which and in the light of which much of 
the lost treasures of Chinese philosophy can be recovered.47 
He set sail for Shanghai from Vancouver, Canada, in late June and 
arrived July 10. He had been away from China for just under seven years. 
Hu Shi was now a "returned student" and a prominent member of China's 
intellectual elite, with a growing reputation and a professorship in 
philosophy awaiting him at Beijing University. 
Hu Shi had found in his studies and experiences in America a 
reinforcement of his earlier "inclination to doubt" that he had developed 
47Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China. 
2nd Edition. (1922 New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1963) 6, 9. First 
published in 1922, the second edition was published one year after his 
death. 
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during his Shanghai days. In addition, his mood seemed to change to a 
more positive frame of mind. He wrote that "I arrived in America full of 
pessimism, but soon .. .I could not escape the contagion of (the American's) 
cheerful outlook on life. "48 His years in the United States of Wilsonian 
idealism instilled in Hu a forward-looking belief in the progress of 
humankind. 
Hu Shi and the May Fourth Movement, 1917-1923 
For a few weeks in July 1917, there was an attempt at restoring the 
Xuantong Emperor (the last emperor, Pu Yi) by a warlord, the military 
governor of Anwei, who hoped to dominate the government in Beijing. 
In fact, no one truly had central authority over China, and just before Hu 
arrived in Shanghai from the United States in mid-July, the northern 
militarists reclaimed the city and Pu Yi was deposed once more. This 
episode vividly illustrates the chaotic political circumstances of the 
Republic, circumstances which continued to frustrate and disappoint Liang 
Qichao, Hu Shi, and all others who had a vision of real political and social 
progress in China. 
Unlike Liang Qichao, Hu Shi did not intend to take a direct role in 
political events but rather to remain a step back. He felt his role should be 
that of observer and critic, one who leads not in politics but in the way of 
thinking. He was convinced that intellectual and cultural regeneration 
must precede political reform in order to lay its foundation. He resolved 
48Hu, Living Philosophies 250. 
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"to refrain from talking politics for twenty years" desiring that, in time, "a 
new foundation for Chinese politics" might be laid.49 
Of course, it was impossible for Hu to refrain from commenting on 
political events. Moreover, even though Hu did primarily concern 
himself and his writings with intellectual and cultural developments, 
these concerns were not, and are not, separate from politics but were 
intricately intertwined with them. The years 1917 to 1923, a period referred 
to as the May Fourth Movement, was a time in which political and social 
change and the conception of modernization took on new dimensions.SO 
The literary renaissance, an integral part of this movement and its 
development, is the event with which Hu Shi' s name is most often 
associated. 
The May Fourth Movement is so named because of the student 
protest which took place on May 4, 1919 in response to China's treatment at 
the Treaty of Versailles which ended World War I. China had been told by 
the allies that, upon Germany's defeat in the war, German territorial 
possessions in Shandong province would be returned to China. However, 
during the war, Japan had taken control of Germany's territory in 
Shandong and, due to the allies' inability to forcibly check Japan at that 
time and the tacit agreements made with other parties by the Japanese 
49Greider, Hu Shih 175. 
50For a full account of the May Fourth Movement, see especially Chow 
Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: The Intellectual Revolution in 
China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960) and Vera 
Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the 
May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986). 
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before the treaty conference, the Japanese were allowed to retain their 
control of Shandong.51 Students took to the streets in indignation, not 
only at the Western nations who allowed the agreement but also in protest 
against the Chinese delegates who were unable to protect Chinese interests. 
Like the 1895 Petition, the events of May 4, 1919 served to broaden 
political awareness and participation. The demonstrations of 1919 widened 
further the belief that protest is an honorable expression of intellectuals' 
concern with political events. In addition, it also served to reinvigorate 
the discussion of new ideas, as disillusionment with the ability of current 
leaders to govern effectively led to further questioning of the political 
progress since the 1911 Revolution. 
The Literary Movement 
At age 26, Hu Shi was already well-known among the Chinese 
intellectual elite. During the year before he returned to China, he 
submitted a number of articles to the New Youth, including two articles 
that contributed to the growing literary movement in China. Hu 
advocated the use of the vernacular language in not only new-style 
magazines and newspapers but for all forms of literature. In addition to 
several attempts at vernacular poetry, Hu Shi's articles in January and 
51 For more information on the Shandong question at the Treaty of 
Versailles, see Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The 
Diplomacy of the Shantung Question (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 
1965) and Thomas Edward Lafarge, China and the World War (New York: 
Howard Fertig, 1973). 
April 1917 promoted the written use of the colloquial language. He 
explained: 
The literary revolution we are promoting aims merely at the 
creation of a Chinese literature of national speech. Only when 
there is such a literature can there be a national speech of literary 
quality ... A dead language can never produce a living 
literature ... The function of language and literature lies in 
expressing ideas and showing feelings . .Those who use a dead 
classical style will...convert their own feelings into literary 
expressions of centuries past...If China wants to have a living 
literature, we must use the plain speech that is the natural speech, 
and we must devote ourselves to a literature of national speech ... 52 
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The literary revolution, as it was known, was the latest in a series of 
movements designed to break down traditional social and political 
structures. A number of trends in the previous decades led up to this 
movement: the increasing attention paid to Western learning, like the 
subjects Hu studied as a teenager in Shanghai; the abolition of the civil 
service examinations in 1905; and not least of all, the proliferation of 
journals that aimed to widen knowledge of and participation in 
government affairs, from Liang Qichao's New Citizen to Hu Shi's The 
Struggle. Intending to broaden education in the realms of subjects studied 
and in the ranks of students, the purpose also was to create new social 
conditions that could be the basis of a new political climate. While a 
certain level of functional literacy had been attained by merchants and 
other "lower" or "middle" classes for several centuries, high literature and 
52Hu Shih, "Constructive Literary Revolution: A Literature of National 
Speech -- A National Speech of Literary Quality," in Wm. Theodore 
deBary, ed. Chinese Sources of Tradition Vol. 2 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1960) 164. 
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writing had been the special preserve of the elite who had the time and 
resources to study for the many years that it took to master the difficult 
classical language. For the men who could attain this level of literacy and 
pass the civil service examinations,s3 the rewards were a government post 
and the attending political power and social prestige.s4 The literary 
movement, by advocating the use of the colloquial language in schools, 
newspapers, magazines, and other literary pursuits, aimed to break down 
this traditional barrier between the world of the educated and the less 
educated. Hu wrote: 
The most conspicuous achievement of the year 1919 has been the 
triumph of vulgate Chinese (baihua) as the recognized instrument 
for journalistic and literary composition as well as for popular 
education ... The art of writing had long been considered a rare gift 
of the gods to the favored few. But the advocacy of the baihua has 
emancipated the youths from this timidity which was the result of 
the unnatural fetters of an antiquated literary formalism. The 
spirit of Young China was never at ease in its ancient 
garments ... with the emancipation of the literary form, there has 
burst forth the youthful spirit...Never before has China had so 
many new writers; never before have there been so many attempts 
made at literary experimentation and creation.SS 
53Many women in elite households were well educated, but the civil 
service examinations were only open to men. 
54The civil service examination system was a meritocracy in that it was 
open to anyone (male), and thus it did allow for some social mobility, 
especially later as merchants became wealthy enough to hire tutors for 
their sons, and in this way, could raise their family's social standing. 
However, even though social mobility was possible in this manner, the 
gulf in education and social standing even between the functionally 
literate and the literati remained a wide one. 
55Hu Shih, "Intellectual China in 1919," The Chinese Social and Political 
Science Review 4:4 (December 1919): 348-349. 
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Because the literary movement's purpose was, like that of the 
development of journalism in previous decades, to educate and activate a 
wider public, it can be seen as a democratization of education in this sense. 
Its proponents hoped that a wider populace would experiment in reading 
and writing literature in its emancipated form and think about cultural 
issues in the process. As Hu Shi wrote: 
We have realized at last that certain things must be given up if 
China is to live. If we really want education, general and universal 
education, we must first have a new language, a language which 
can be used and understood by tongue and ear and pen, and which 
will be a living language for the people.56 
This literary revolution had implications far wider than in the field of 
writing, and that was its intention. Hu maintained that "as language is the 
most important vehicle of thought and of expression, any radical and 
fundamental change in a national language could not but involve a great 
change in other phases of social and intellectual life."57 Indeed, by 
incorporating not only words but also ideas from popular folk culture into 
the new literature, the movement brought about a "vernacularization of 
values"58 meaning that the experiences and ideas of ordinary people were 
regarded as worthy of attention. In fact, the literary revolution was one 
aspect of the greater New Culture Movement in which the traditional 
"high culture" of Confucianism was discredited and a search for 
alternative native traditions was undertaken. A vital concern for the 
56Hu Shih, "The Renaissance in China," Journal of the Royal Institute c:f 
International Affairs 5:6 (November 1926): 271. 
57 Hu, "The Renaissance in China" 273. 
58Schwarcz 79. 
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continuity of Chinese tradition made the study of popular or folk culture 
of great importance.59 Hu stated in 1933, years later, that the literary 
revolution 
was a movement of conscious protest against many of the ideas 
and institutions in the traditional culture, and of conscious 
emancipation of the individual man and woman from the 
bondage of the forces of tradition. It was a movement of reason 
versus tradition, freedom versus authority, and glorification of life 
and human values versus their suppression. 60 
The New Culture Movement (roughly dated 1915-27) represented a 
shift in intellectuals' focus of modernization from politics to social and 
cultural development. Near the end of 1919, Hu wrote: 
Ever since 1898, the attention of intellectual China has been 
confined to things political...(but) eight years of bitter failure under 
a nominal republic has gradually brought young China to the 
realization that democracy cannot be secured through political 
changes alone ... Democracy .. .is no more and no less than the sum 
total of all the democratized and democratizing forces, social, 
economic, moral, and intellectual. It is this realization which 
constitutes one of the guiding principles of the new movements in 
Ch. 61 1na. 
The movement's reinvigorated search for new ideas, political and 
cultural, fed Hu Shi's optimism about cultural and social developments: 
It was the nonpolitical forces -- the students, the merchants, the 
demonstrations and street orations, and the boycott -- that did the 
59see especially Lawrence A. Schneider, Ku Chieh-kang and China's New 
History: Nationalism and the Quest for Alternative Traditions (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971). 
60Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance, 2nd Edition (New York: Paragon 
Book Reprint Corp., 1963) 44. These were a series of lectures delivered in 
1933 to the Department of Comparative Religion in the University of 
Chicago. 
61 Hu Shih, "Intellectual China in 1919" The Chinese Social and Politicn l 
Science Review 4:4 (December 1919): 350. 
work and triumphed .. .let alone the petty political intrigues in 
Peking and elsewhere -- we still have the masses to educate, the 
women to emancipate, the schools to reform, the home industries 
to develop, the family system to reshape, the dead and antiquated 
ideas to combat, the false and harmful idols to dethrone, the many, 
many social and economic wrongs to redress. It is in these new 
channels of activity that Young China, with reawakened hope and 
vigor, is now working slowly but steadily to rebuild a new 
foundation for Chinese democracy. 62 
Hu 's Intellectual Detachment from Politics 
70 
Over the next several years, however, the forces that Hu had 
previously called "non-political" became increasingly engaged in political 
activities. Both Sun Yat-sen's re-formed Nationalist Party and the new 
Chinese Communist Party (founded in 1921) drew on the young 
intellectuals' enthusiasm for new ideologies. This trend disturbed Hu. In 
an essay, "Problems and Isms," Hu warned that abstractions and vague 
generalizations can obscure concrete problems and solutions. "There is no 
abstract noun in the world which can comprise all of the propositions of a 
particular person or group." Because one term can be adopted for different 
circumstances separated by time or space, "abstractions can be used to 
deceive people."63 The Chinese Communist Party's dogmatic ideology was 
opposed to Hu Shi' s commitment to methodical investigation of specific 
problems. 
62Hu, "Intellectual China in 1919" 351. 
63Hu Shi, "Wenti yu Zhuyi." (Problems and Isms.) In Sharon Shih-juan 
Hou and Chih-ping Chou, eds. Hu Shi Reader: An Advanced Reading 
Text for Modern Chinese (New Haven, Conn.: Far Eastern Publications, 
1990)149-170. Originally published in Chinese in Meizhou Pinglun 
(Weekly Critic) 31: July 20, 1919. (My translation.) 
In 1922, Hu founded The Endeavor (Ni'llz Zhoubao), a magazine 
which he intended to keep above the fray of political discussions. 
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However, the writers and editors on this project were committed to a more 
direct link between cultural and political reform. Certainly, the connection 
between cultural and social issues and political ones could not really be 
separated. Hu finally acquiesced, saying: 
... now I can stand it no longer. If I come out at the present juncture 
to speak of politics, although in part I am driven to it by the 
corruption of domestic politics, in fact I am compelled to speak in 
large part by the 'new public opinion' of recent years, which 'talks a 
great deal of isms, but does not study problems.' In talking politics 
now I am only putting into practice my own proposal to 'study 
more problems and talk less of isms' .. .I am greatly dissatisfied with 
present-day thought and art...The rotten old orthodoxies have been 
overthrown, but in their place are various wretched new 
h d . 64 ort o ox1es. 
The second issue of The Endeavor featured a proclamation entitled 
"Our Political Proposals" in which was written: 
We believe that we must have a practical, clear-cut goal which is 
intelligible to everybody if we talk of politics. And we believe that 
the goal of "good government" should be the most modest 
requirement for the present political reform of China, a goal which 
is commonly recognized by all the Chinese elite, regardless of what 
their ideal political institutions are ... 65 
Their suggestions included issues such as the reunification of northern 
and southern governments, the re-establishment of a "legitimate" 
64Greider, Hu Shih 189. 
65Translated in Chow 241. See footnote (or Grieder, Hu Shih, footnote on 
190) for the list of signatories. Interestingly, the idea for "Our Political 
Proposals" originated with an associate of Liang Qichao' s, but due to their 
previous alliances with the governments of Yuan Shikai and other 
warlords and hence their reputation for political opportunism, Hu and his 
group did not seek their suggestions or signatures. 
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parliamentary institution, the drafting of a permanent constitution, 
disarmament, and bureaucratic reforms. The document also addressed the 
major problems of the political climate of the warlord era: large "private" 
armies funded by foreign loans and heavy domestic levies, a swollen 
bureaucracy with official posts held by those with powerful connections 
rather than ability, parliamentary processes fabricated to serve the interests 
of autocrats, the absence of the rule of law applicable to both politicians and 
civilians, and the indifference of these governments to the opinions of 
their critics or the people over whom they govern. 66 The opening 
paragraphs stated that no matter what ideal of political organization or 
ideology, the objective of political reform in China should be "good 
government." 
The minimal significance of 'good government': What we call 
'good government' is, in its negative aspect, the existence of proper 
organs to oversee and protect against all illegal, self-seeking, and 
madly corrupt officials. On the positive side, we raise two points: 
1. Fully to utilize the instruments of politics to plan for the total 
welfare of the whole society. 
2. Fully to tolerate the freedom of the individual, and to love and 
protect the development of individuality (geren xzng)67 
The document went on to propose three "fundamental principles" of 
political reform: a constitutional government, a 'public government' 
(gongkai de zhengfu), and a 'government with a plan' "because we firmly 
believe that China's great malady is unplanned and aimless drifting."
68 
66chow 241 and Greider, Hu Shih 190-191. 
67 Greider, Hu Shih 191. 
68Greider, Hu Shih 191-192. 
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Hu Shi had long been in favor of a strong government, a 
government with a plan, remarking in 1914 while a student in America, 
that "The tendency of modern Western political theory is away from 
laissez-faire and toward intervention by the state." As a student, he also 
wrote: 
The greatest need at present is to fix one's purpose and to establish 
a fundamental policy ... and, when this has been done, to work 
steadily for a period of twenty or fifty years without faltering. Only 
then can there be some hope for national salvation.69 
He regarded European laissez-faire liberalism as a negative response to 
administrative incompetence rather than a principle of government. In 
1923 he called for "political instrumentalism," defining this political 
approach: 
To find the best form of government, to persuade others that it is 
the best; and having done so to stir them up to insist on having it, 
is the order of ideas in the minds of those who adopt this view of 
political philosophy ... Government is a tool for us to use, to 
experiment with, to master and control, to love and cherish, but 
not something to be afraid of. A government intelligently 
conscious of its own instrumental potentialities, and, at the same 
time, subject to democratic control, is the only kind of political 
machinery worthy of the new age of science and technology. 70 
A number of leaders in the 1920s saw federalism, the granting of a 
level of autonomy to the provinces, as a potential solution to the problems 
of a weak central government and the fractious regionalism of the war lord 
era. Hu Shi concurred, maintaining that Chinese history shows that the 
69creider, Hu Shih 193. 
70Hu Shih, "Instrumentalism as a Political Concept." In Studies in 
Political Science and Sociology (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1941) 3,6. 
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country is too large and too diverse to be successfully governed centrally. 
"To encourage the development of genuine regional authority and thus to 
enable the various regions to develop the strength that lies latent there, in 
order to wage war on the war lords and to overthrow them -- this is the 
meaning of provincial self-government and the purpose of the federalist 
movement."71 Hunan promulgated a provincial constitution along 
federalist lines in 1922, and other provincial leaders discussed federalist 
ideas. Unfortunately, provincial constitutions and reforms could not 
overcome the forces of warlordism, and the movement died out. 72 
Hu's prescriptions for political reform, though democratic in 
character, were elitist in the sense that they were intellectual solutions, 
heavily dependent on intellectual leadership. Despite this elitist bent, Hu 
was firmly committed to democratic ideals. He not only saw democracy as 
embodying certain political institutions, but believed that it was a social 
and intellectual state of mind. Unlike Liang Qichao, Hu did not believe 
that the lack of a well educated populace necessitated a period of political 
tutelage before the establishment of democratic institutions. Instead, he 
argued the opposite: that democratic institutions are essential to education 
71Greider, Hu Shih 195. 
72Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism and the 
Failure of Constitutionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976) 6. See also John Fincher, "Political Provincialism and the National 
Revolution," in Mary Clabaugh Wright, ed. China in Revolution: The 
First Phase (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) 185-226; Jean 
Chesneaux, "The Federalist Movement in China, 1920-3," in Jack Gray, ed. 
Modern China's Search for a Political Form (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969) 96-137; and William L. Tung, The Political Institutions of 
Modern China (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968) 84-85. 
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and will lead to the attainment of democracy in its fully developed sense. 
In The Endeavor he wrote: 
Looking at the matter in the light of the experience of the 
democratic nations, we must recognize that democratic institutions 
are an instrument for the training of good citizens ... The reason that 
democratic institutions can be adopted by other nations is simply 
because of the fact that the institutions themselves perform an 
educative function ... Any nation which has experienced training 
through democratic institutions over a long period of time will 
possess a higher level of civic knowledge and morality than other 
nations ... The spread of civic knowledge is an important condition 
for the cultivation of civic morality. 73 
While Hu expected little change from warlord governments, he did not 
advocate revolutionary action. The purpose of "Our Political Proposals" 
was to invigorate discussion, and it succeeded in this goal. The main 
criticism of the document matched the main criticism of Hu Shi: the 
production of ideas needed to be backed up with action. One critic wrote: 
" ... to rely only on propaganda seems to me still the attitude of scholars, and 
not sufficiently thoroughgoing ... Why not form yourselves into a 'Good 
Government Party'? If there are only proposals, but no concrete 
organization, then I fear that these suggestions are merely empty talk and 
will never be realized in fact." 74 Hu's critics maintained that without 
direct participation in a political party, true influence is minimal. 
In response to critics of the "good government group's" detached 
stance, Hu wrote: 
The greatest need at the present time is to propagandize this 
commonplace and general aim, to make the people recognize 
73Greider, Hu Shih 198. 
74Greider, Hu Shih 199. 
clearly that our common enemy is the bad government of the 
forces of evil, and that our responsibility is to wage war against it. 
Now, and in the near future, we should all occupy the position of 
mediators, impartial men, judges, and overseers. In the future, 
after politics have got on the right track, differences in concrete 
proposals will perhaps force us to organize a political party, but that 
. h . 75 1s anot er question. 
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Hu previously had been cautiously optimistic about political parties just 
after the establishment of the Republic, but later became disappointed in 
their "narrow attitudes," "mutual intolerance," and "constant bickering." 
In another essay, "Political Critics and Political Parties," written at about 
the same time, Hu posited that there are three categories of political critics. 
The first category comprise those that follow a particular political party, the 
second include those who lead a party, and the third are those that are 
unaffiliated with any party but supervise the entire process. These last are: 
... transcendent and independent. They recognize only society and 
the nation, not parties and cliques. They take a statesmanlike view, 
not a partisan view. Perhaps by temperament and ability they are 
not fitted to organize a political party. They can comprehend 
matters, but not necessarily manage affairs; they can plan, but not 
necessarily execute; they can criticize men, but they don't 
necessarily know how to deal with them. They should, of course, 
exploit their strong points, and certainly they should not try to do 
76 what they cannot do well. 
It is clear that Hu felt that he belonged in the third category, the category 
that creates ideas on which to build politics and political institutions. 
Three of Hu's fellow signatories of "Our Political Proposals" were 
appointed to cabinet posts in the new administration of 1922, but soon this 
75creider, Hu Shih 200. 
76Greider, Hu Shih 201. 
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new government, too, became embroiled in corrupt dealings. This fiasco 
became an embarrassment to the "good government group" and The 
Endeavor, confirming to Hu and other like-minded intellectuals that they 
should remain out of politics. Due to disappointment concerning this 
incident and an illness which took Hu out of Beijing for a leave of absence, 
The Endeavor ceased publication in 1923. For several years, Hu refrained 
from directly commenting on political events, publishing instead poetry 
and culturally-minded scholarly essays in the Modern Critic (Xiandai 
P{nglun), a publication of a group of Beijing University professors. 
Hu Shi was distressed by the increasingly militant activities of 
students during this period. He had consistently believed, since his 
student days in Shanghai and the United States, that a student's first duty 
is to study. In late 1925, he wrote: 
Imperialism cannot be beaten down by bare fists. The British and 
Japanese bandits will not die by tens of millions of voices yelling 
and cursing. Saving the country is the paramount cause. Parading 
and yelling in a high voice "Down with British and Japanese 
bandits!" cannot be counted as saving the country. Cutting off a 
finger to write in blood, committing suicide by throwing yourself 
into the river or sea, becoming a martyr for your country, all 
cannot be counted as saving the country. The undertaking of 
saving the country must have many kinds of talented people. Real 
preparation for saving the country is to make yourself a useful 
person with ability .. .Saving the country must begin with saving 
yourself.77 
This argument is reminiscent of his response to student activism during 
his own university days in the United States when he attempted to 
77Hu Shi, "Aiguo Yundong Yu Qiuxue." (Patriotic Movement and 
Scholarly Pursuits.) Hu Shi Reader 171-198. Originally in Chinese in 
Modern Critic (Xiandai Pinglun) 2: 39 (Sept. 5, 1925) 5-9. (My translation.) 
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persuade his fellow students, after the 1915 Twenty-One Demands from the 
Japanese, to keep calm and study. This stance reflects not only Hu's 
aversion to radicalism but also his conviction that intellectuals must hold 
themselves above the fray of direct political activism in order to work for 
gradual progress. 
During the late 1920s, the Nationalists and the Chinese Communist 
Party became the dominant opposing political forces in China, promoting 
their particular brands of anti-imperialism and revolutionary nationalism. 
Hu was always averse to the Communists' dogmatic attachment to, in his 
view, overly simplified "isms" that "ignore our real enemies and lead us 
further and further away from our real objective, the creation of a modern 
nation."78 Still, the following section will show that Hu was continually 
frustrated by the Nationalists' scorn for political criticism and their refusal 
to promote constitutionalism and undertake other political reforms. 
Hu Shi's Struggle with the Nationalists, 1927-37 
In the summer of 1926, Hu departed China for Europe and the 
United States, where he spent time at centers of sinological research in 
Paris and London and lectured at various universities in Europe and 
America. He returned to Shanghai in the spring of 1927 when labor union 
activists were under siege from Chiang Kai-shek's troops and cooperating 
78Hu Shih, "Which Road Shall We Take?" translated in T'ang Leang-li, 
ed. China's Own Critics: A Selection of Essays by Hu Shih and Lin Yu-
tang, with Commentaries by Wang Ching-wei (New York: Paragon Book 
Reprint Corp. 1969) 20. The real enemies, according to Hu, were poverty, 
disease, ignorance, corruption, and disorder. 
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local toughs. Nationalist troops controlled most of southern China and 
continued to move north. As northern warlords were weakened, the 
center of political control shifted from Beijing to Nanjing, where the 
Nationalists had moved their capital from the south. Shanghai, then, was 
closer to the new capital. In addition, it remained the center of publishing 
houses and still offered a number of reputable educational institutions. 
Returning to China reinvigorated from his travels, Hu joined a group of 
scholars in publishing The Crescent (Xznyu~). This magazine offered 
poetry, literary criticism, and political commentary. 
Hu tolerated the Nationalist government, like the warlord 
predecessors, as the disagreeable but de facto ruling power, seeing his own 
position as that of a loyal opposition. He never aimed to overthrow 
Nationalist authority but sought to enlighten and reform it, very similar to 
Liang Qichao's goals a generation before. He found, however, that the 
Nationalist leaders did not appreciate the necessity or function of criticism, 
constructive though it was intended to be. The Nationalists were hardly 
more tolerant of divergent views than the Communists, and several times 
it seemed that it was the clout of Hu's former fellow overseas students, 
now holding positions in Chiang's government, that kept him out of jail. 79 
In The Crescent, as in The Endeavor, Hu stressed the need for 
exercising authority through "the proper organs of government." He 
wrote in 1929 that if "the basis for lawful government" is truly desired, 
"the first thing we must do is to draw up a constitution for the Republic of 
79Greider, Hu Shih 226, 242-245. 
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China." But he was willing to compromise with the existing powers; 
acknowledging the Nationalists' argument for a period of political tutelage, 
Hu maintained, "At the very least we must draw up a provisional 
constitution for the so-called period of political tutelage."80 A few months 
later, he continued: 
We want to ask what inconsistency there is between training the 
people and having a constitution ... We do not believe that without 
a constitution there can be a tutelage government. Without a 
constitution there can be only a dictatorship.81 
In another essay the same year, Hu explained: 
Democracy in itself serves as an education. People will inevitably 
make mistakes when they participate in politics in an early stage, 
but we cannot stop the participation of the people merely because 
they do not live up to our expectations. What people need is not 
specialized knowledge but an experience in participation. The basic 
concept of democracy consists in a recognition of the reliability of 
people's common sense ... Governing a country is a big business, 
requiring specialized knowledge to solve social problems. But the 
participation of people in politics is not a special problem. It does 
not require the participants to possess specialized knowledge.82 
This passage shows that Hu's elitism is balanced with a belief in ordinary 
people's common sense and their potential to learn by experience. 
Hu Shi continued to criticize not only Nationalist policies but the 
theories of the late founder, Sun Yat-sen, as well. In July 1928, Hu was 
stripped of his position as a member of the Board of the China Foundation 
80Hu, "Human Rights and the Provisional Constitution" translated in 
China's Own Critics 28. 
81Hu, "When Can We Have a Constitution?" translated in China's Own 
Critics 37. 
82Yang 107. See also the translation in China's Own Critics 33-34. 
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for the Promotion of Education and Culture,83 the agency which 
administered the American Boxer Indemnity fund. In the spring of 1929, 
he was accused of having "overstepped the limit of scholarly discussion 
and indulged in meaningless quibbling"84 and was nearly arrested for 
"false opinions" for "having publicly insulted our late Leader and the 
Party."85 Then in 1930, Nationalist authorities made a deal with 
Shanghai's China National Institute, securing Hu's resignation in 
exchange for official accreditation of the university by the Ministry of 
Education.86 Near the end of the year Hu returned to Beijing, at 39, as dean 
of the College of Arts at Beijing University and to head the recently 
established Compilation and Translation Committee of the China 
Foundation. 
The national crisis in China escalated in 1931 with the Japanese 
conquest of Manchuria. For its duration from 1932 to 1937, The 
Independent Critic (Dtlzl P{nglun) was the journal through which Hu Shi 
argued for constitutionalism, warned against authoritarianism, and 
considered the practicability of democracy for China. The editorial 
introduction stated: 
We now begin this magazine because we want to publish our 
opinions in a timely manner, to be like bait, drawing attention and 
discussion. The expectations for the readers are the same as for 
83The Nanjing government abolished the old board and named a new 
one, even though its charter provided for vacancies in memberships to be 
filled through election by the other members. Greider, Hu Shih 241-242. 
84T'ang Leang-li, Preface, China's Own Critics vii. 
85Greider, Hu Shih 240-244. 
86Greider, Hu Shih 245. 
ourselves; we do not expect to obtain total agreement but only 
expect criticism and discussion that is fair-minded and based on 
facts. We call this magazine Independent Critic (Dull P{nghln) 
because we all hope to forever have an independent spirit. We 
will not lean towards any political party, nor worship any 
superstitions, but use responsible words to present the results of 
our thinking. This is an independent spirit.87 
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During this period, young intellectuals became increasingly frustrated with 
the Nationalists concentration on combating internal Chinese enemies, in 
the name of unity, rather than fighting the Japanese. While critics' 
complaints grew louder, their suppression by the Nationalists increased 
proportionately. 
Even though Hu was a leading critic of the Nationalists, his own 
views earned him much criticism in this period, too. He opposed a 
militant response to Japan until very late,88 arguing for negotiation, and he 
also opposed the militant activities of many young intellectuals at this 
time: "The students' fundamental obligation is to endeavor unceasingly to 
develop their knowledge and talents. Social progress is bit-by-bit progress, 
and the strength of the nation depends upon the strength of 
individuals. "89 In addition, some of his readers were disturbed by his use 
of Japan as an example of a nation that had succeeded in modernization 
where China had not. Hu, however, was not an apologist for Japan, but he 
did hold out more hope than most for Japanese self-restraint and the 
87"Yin Yan." (Editorial Introduction.) Duli Pinglun (Independent Critic) 1 
(May 22, 1932): 2. (My translation.) 
88Jn 1935, when Japan demanded an "autonomous area" comprising five 
northern provinces, Hu concluded that China had no alternative but to 
fight "for self-preservation." Greider, Hu Shih 254. 
89Greider, Hu Shih 257. 
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influence upon them of world opinion. Historian Jerome Greider writes: 
"What is revealed in Hu's writings of this period is the confusion of a 
mind which shunned violence in a violent age and clung in a time of 
duplicity to a naive faith in good will, and which stubbornly prized 
reasonableness above all else in a deranged world. "90 
Hu's appraisal of China's progress varied according to whether he 
was comparing it to the West or against China's own former condition. 
The revolutionaries of 1911, he wrote in the Independent Critic: 
... envisioned a free and egalitarian, a glorious and flourishing 
nation. Twenty-three years have passed, and we are still a third-
rate nation that cannot hold up its head. They dreamed of creating 
a free people living under a democratic constitution, but twenty-
three years later there are still not a few who imagine that they 
have fixed their gaze even higher, who sneer at popular rights and 
freedom but sing the praises of autocracy and dream of creating a 
new slavery under despotism!91 
On the other hand, he was encouraged by the change that had been made, 
and wrote of those to encourage others. "The China before our eyes is no 
longer something that can be described by the term 'old society' ... To say 
that we are not yet sufficiently modern is irrefutable. To say that this is still 
the 'old society' .. .is to deny reality."92 He continued in a separate essay the 
same year (1934): 
If in all fairness we reckon up the accounts of the last twenty years 
and more, in the end we must acknowledge that in the republican 
period we have made great progress, nor can we fail to recognize 
that this progress is in large part a result of the blessings bestowed 
upon us by the liberation effected by the revolutionary trends since 
1911. If we clearly acknowledge the achievements secured by the 
90Greider, Hu Shih 250. 
91Greider, Hu Shih 257-258. 
92Greider, Hu Shih 258. 
endeavors of the last two decades, we can overcome pessimism and 
find the courage we need to move forward ... Pessimism and 
disillusionment can never help us to bear our heavy burden down 
the long road that lies ahead!93 
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Of course, the Nationalists used the pretext of the lack of an educated 
populace to justify their authoritarian "political tutelage." Hu Shi, 
however, continued to advocate his conviction that democratic 
institutions were instrumental in educating the population. He argued 
that democratic government is "government by common sense" (changsh( 
de zhengzh~), and despotism, even enlightened despotism, needs 
"government by especially outstanding men" (tebie yzngji6 de zhengzhz). 
Therefore, "in a country like ours, lacking talented people, the best political 
training is democratic constitutionalism, which can gradually broaden (the 
base of) political authority."94 Furthermore, he argued that national unity, 
whether physical or psychological, must come from below, through the 
operation of political institutions designed "gradually to cultivate a 
centripetal force throughout the nation, and gradually to create a 'public 
loyalty' (gong zhong) in place of the 'private loyalties' (sz zhong) of the 
present time. "95 Hu Shi wrote in the Independent Critic: 
The advantage of democratic politics is that it does not require 
outstanding talented people, and it will be able to gradually 
broaden (the base of) political authority (tuTguang zhengquan), 
there is room for flexibility; by collecting everyone's ideas (jzsT 
guangyz), the majority of (simple people) can combine their 
common sense and enable themselves to deal with politics on a 
93Greider, Hu Shih 259. 
94Hu Shi, "Zai Lun Jianguo Yu Zhuanzhi." (Another Discussion of 
National Reconstruction and Authoritarianism.) Duli Pinglun 
(Independent Critic) 82 (Dec. 24, 1933):2-5. (My translation.) 
95Greider, Hu Shih 267. 
basic level; this will give the majority of simple people a chance to 
participate in politics and train them to safeguard their rights (aihit 
zzjl de quanll).96 
His theory of "kindergarten democracy" follows the logic of 
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democratic institutions as education. He argued that democracy "is but a 
kindergarten system best suited to train a people inexperienced in 
politics."97 Furthermore, "Democratic government requires only that a 
qualified electorate be able to exercise its civic rights to good effect; training 
of this kind is not difficult. "98 He argued, from his observation of political 
life in the United States, that a democratic system takes into account the 
political apathy of the majority of the population in that it does not 
demand of them intensive and relentless involvement in politics that 
authoritarian systems often do. In addition, when the people do 
participate, they are expressing genuine support and concern since those 
who wish to remain uninvolved may do so. He concluded that 
constitutional democracy "is not an unattainable ideal system, but a system 
of government by common sense that can, given room to develop, 
gradually improve and broaden the base of political authority. "99 
Hu maintained that political institutions will promote a democratic 
culture and society. He argued in 1937: 
constitutional politics can begin at any time and place, but it must 
start from the kindergarten level and gradually move up. 
96Hu Shi, "Zai Lun Jianguo Yu Zhuanzhi." (Another Discussion of 
National Reconstruction and Authoritarianism.) Duli Pinglun 82 (Dec. 24, 
1933): 2-5. (My translation.) 
97chou 133. 
98Greider, Hu Shih 267. 
99Greider, Hu Shih 268. 
Constitutional politics is a habit of life, and the only way to learn it 
is to take part in this kind of life.100 
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Even though he argued that democracy should be implemented at 
once, he spoke of involving only a minority of the population: chambers 
of commerce, university faculties and educational associations, bar 
associations and banking and finance groups, the general labor unions, and 
the party.101 Regarding the debate on the rights of the National Assembly 
in 1936-1937, Hu wrote: 
In the primary state, we should restrict voting rights to those 
citizens who have received elementary education for at least one 
year. With the increasing number of educated citizens, the political 
rights can be extended to the whole nation. This does not intend to 
take away the voting rights from the majority by the criterion of 
education level. It is only a strategy to stimulate ordinary people to 
learn to read and write.102 
He did call on the Nationalist government for a "opening up of political 
power" (kaifang zhengquan) to counter their insistence on the dominance 
of their party above all others. "My common sense tells me: the welfare of 
the people above all, the life of the nation above all...in the interests of 
justice, and in order to unify national support, the Nationalist Party should 
make political power public, and permit the people of the whole nation 
freely to organize political parties and groups. "103 
lOOchou 133. 
101Greider, Hu Shih 271. 
102Yang 138-139. 
103Hu, "Zhengzhi Gaige de Dalu." (The Great Road Toward the Reform of 
Political Institutions.) Duli Pinglun 163 (Aug 11, 1935): 2-9. (My 
translation.) 
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Hu was averse to partisanship and to a political process based on the 
representation of competing interests. Hu wrote in 1935: 
We may expect that in the future Chinese politics will not 
experience enthusiastic competition among political parties. If we 
examine the national crisis of the past four years, we see that as 
national consciousness increases, partisanism declines. This is not 
merely a Chinese phenomenon ... Far-sighted statesmen should 
seize upon this tendency to create a consciousness of "nation above 
all" and a national, supraparty politics (chaodangpai de 
zhengzh 'i) .104 
Hu wanted the Nationalists "to move from one-party government to 
nonpartisan government, and in this way to establish a political style in 
China that might serve as a model to the world ... "105 Later in life, Hu Shi 
wrote We Must Choose Our Own Way, published in 1949, in which he 
addresses the function of opposition parties: 
Standing opposite to the ruling party, the opposition party aims at 
first to supervise the government in establishing the strictest 
evaluating and supervising organization; secondly, to offer the 
opportunities for the people to make choices so that the political 
power of the nation will be transferred through a legal way. Strict 
evaluation and supervision, peaceful transference of political 
power are the ways leading to peaceful reformation for a modern 
democratic country.106 
Hu's tendency to hope for the government to form policies based on 
common interests, in the wake of warlordism, perhaps is understandable. 
Nonetheless, it seems surprising that Hu so often discounted the dynamic 
of competing interests in politics. "Supraparty politics" is rather 
104Hu, "Cong Yidang Dao Wudang de Zhengzhi." (From One Party to 
Nonpartisan Politics.) Duli Pinglun 171 (Oct. 6, 1935): 10-12. (My 
translation.) 
105Hu, "Cong Yidang Dao Wudang de Zhengzhi." (My translation.) 
106y ang 101. 
88 
authoritarian, as any government formed on "common interests" is going 
to reflect the "common interests" of only a few. 
While Hu was bitingly critical of the Nationalist government, he 
was a reformer rather than a revolutionary and was willing to work with 
what was available. In this direction, he continuously insisted upon the 
writing of a permanent constitution as a first step toward political order 
and democracy. He contended, reminiscent of Liang Qichao' s views on 
constitutionalism, that the establishment of a constitution would make the 
Nationalist government stronger by making it legitimate. At the same 
time, however, Hu did conceive of constitutionalism as the establishment 
of a rule of law, meaning that the government would have to abide by the 
law. In the Independent Critic, he wrote: 
Constitutional democracy is nothing but to set a rule as a scope 
within which government and its people can have political 
activities. Both government and people must observe the rule 
within this scope. It is thus called constitutional· government. It is 
also called constitutional democracy because any capable citizen is 
permitted to participate in politics, to express his personal 
opinions, to operate politics by proper means ..... Constitutional 
government means a political system in which all concerned are 
required to observe law, namely, it is law-abiding politics.107 
The launching of the "New Life Movement" by the Nationalist 
Party in 1934 underscored a major division between Hu Shi and the 
Nationalists. The New Life Movement, partly in response to the anti-
traditionalism of the Chinese Communists, aimed to restore the value of 
Confucianism, from extolling frugality to proposing tips on personal 
hygiene. While Hu valued many aspects of Confucian virtue, he was 
107Yang 115-118. 
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exasperated by the Nationalists' opposition to intellectual innovation, the 
only path towards modernity in Hu's view. Hu rightly saw this 
movement, telling the people to brush their teeth and not to spit in public, 
as superficial and incapable of leading to true progress. Furthermore, he 
angrily viewed the Confucian revival as a revocation of the intellectual 
progress that had been achieved in recent decades: 
Pitiful and despairing old revolutionary party! You wanted a 
revolution, but now that the revolution has achieved these twenty 
years of unprecedented progress, you disown it. What progress 
there has been in these two decades was not a gift from Confucius, 
but the result of a common revolutionary struggle, the result of a 
common acceptance of the new civilization of a new world. Our 
only hope lies in moving forward.108 
Though Hu was often criticized for advocating "total 
Westernization," he did not equate modernization with 
Westernization. He frequently criticized Chinese cultural traditions, often 
bitterly, but he did not intend to repudiate the whole tradition. He aimed 
to provoke his compatriots to think critically about different aspects of 
Chinese tradition in order to evaluate its particular usefulness in the 
modern world. 
What pessimistic observers have lamented as the collapse of 
Chinese civilization, is exactly the necessary undermining and 
erosion without which there could not have been the rejuvenation 
of an old civilization. Slowly, quietly, but unmistakably, the 
Chinese Renaissance is becoming a reality. The product of this 
rebirth looks suspiciously occidental. But, scratch its surface and 
you will find that the stuff of which it is made is essentially the 
Chinese bedrock which much weathering and corrosion have only 
made stand out more clearly -- the humanistic and rationalistic 
108Greider, Hu Shih 284. 
China resurrected by the touch of the scientific and democratic 
civilization of the new world.109 
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Hu left Beijing in early July 1937, just before China plunged into its 
darkest days of war after fighting broke out between Japanese and Chinese 
troops near the Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing. Soon after, the Japanese 
invaded Shanghai and Nanjing. Finally Hu Shi realized that a peaceful 
settlement was not possible, and he officially proclaimed his allegiance to 
the Nationalists in the name of preserving the state.110 In mid-September, 
Hu left China as a semi-official emissary to plead China's case in the 
United States and Europe. He spent all but seven of his remaining twenty-
five years abroad, returning to Beijing as Chancellor of Beijing University 
from 1946 to 1948 and finally residing in Taiwan from 1958 until his death 
in 1962. His years abroad were spent representing the Nationalists' case in 
America, as well as America's position to Nationalist leaders. He lectured 
to academic and civic groups in the United States, often speaking of his 
hopes for democratic progress in China, and attended the founding 
conference of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 as a member of 
the Chinese delegation. Even during some of the most desperate years 
when war all but stalled China's modern development, Hu Shi remained a 
steadfast proponent of democratic principles in society and politics. 
109Hu, preface,The Chinese Renaissance. 
110Greider, Hu Shih 293. 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
DEMOCRACY AND MODERNITY 
91 
Liang Qichao and Hu Shi represent two generations of political 
change and intellectual development in China. The development of 
democratic ideas in China can be followed through the ideas of Liang and 
Hu and the modernizing trends of their respective generations, in which 
the definition of modernity changed from one characterized by concerns 
with political transition to one that emphasized cultural transformation as 
the foundation of modern China. The differences in their concepts can be 
linked to the specific challenges that their particular generations faced as 
well as their own personalities. 
For Liang and Hu and others like them, democracy for China 
signified modernity. Modernization was the paramount objective, so the 
definition of democracy and the details of its potential implementation 
changed over time as the definition of modernization changed. For Liang 
Qichao's generation, modernization entailed the transformation of the 
political system for the strengthening of the nation and thus, Liang 
deliberated the usefulness of democracy in a constitutional monarchy and 
later in the establishment and building of the Republic. Hu Shi's 
generation was disappointed with the failure of the 1911 Republican 
Revolution's political transition to propel China's progress, and its 
definition of modernity meant a democratic transformation in the cultural 
environment and in social conditions. 
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Democracy, Modernity and Political Reform 
Liang Qichao came of age at a time when knowledge of Western 
ideas was only beginning to seep into intellectual circles in China. Periods 
of reform in previous dynasties had meant the reinterpretation and 
reinvigoration of Confucian concepts, and reform in the latter half of the 
1800s still meant reform within the Confucian tradition. The urgency of 
studying Western scientific and technological expertise had been 
recognized as early as the 1860s, but the belief in the superiority of Chinese 
culture and social and political institutions dominated. Liang and other 
progressive intellectuals of the 1890s had to overcome this Confucian 
mind-set in order to push for the consideration of Western-style political 
reforms. 
The inclusion of Western ideas of democracy in political 
modernization in China began with Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao' s 
Petition of 1895. Their evolving definition of modernity was motivated by 
the proven inadequacy of the early modernizing scheme of the 1860s and 
1870s Self-Strengthening Movement. Japan and the strongest Western 
nations not only possessed technologically advanced weapons, but also 
possessed what Chinese observers perceived as democratic political 
institutions in which citizens and groups outside officialdom had an 
influence. The few Chinese who had traveled to Europe, America, or 
Japan reported on the energetic involvement of their citizens in all realms 
of life, including politics. In the Chinese view, these nations derived their 
strength and modernity from the vigorous involvement of their people in 
public life, whether it meant an educated person holding a government 
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post or an ordinary citizen reading the newspapers to keep up with current 
national and international events; this involvement the Chinese 
observers roughly understood as democracy. They decided that this kind of 
democratic energy could activate China's modernization. 
Liang's generation, reformers and revolutionaries at their peak of 
activity between the 1895 Petition and the 1911 fall of the imperial system, 
can be characterized similarly by their commitment to political change and 
their role as political activists. They were "animated by the spirit of 
political entrepreneurship"l and strongly believed in the value of 
transforming political institutions as a way of renovating the Chinese 
nation. They broke with their predecessors, the Confucian reformers of the 
nineteenth century, in forming political associations with other like-
minded intellectuals and in entertaining a variety of ideas of Western 
political systems, most notably, democratic systems. 
Whether reformers or revolutionaries, they shared an urgent 
concern with the survival of the Chinese nation, and agreed that the first 
objective was political change built on a politically aware and participatory 
population. Liang' s contribution to China's development was in the realm 
of political organization and arousing nationalist propaganda, reflecting 
the activities considered most important by his generation. His 
involvement in drafting the 1895 Petition, organizing study societies, and 
writing and editing the new-style political journals of his time were his 
most noteworthy activities. Through these modern study societies and 
lGreider, Intellectuals and the State 135. 
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political journals, he was an early conduit of foreign ideas to his Chinese 
audiences. 
Liang' s theme of "new citizens" was sounded in the literature of 
reformers and revolutionaries alike. The political activists of Liang' s 
generation were confident that political change would effect the 
corresponding social transformation on which to build a modern China. 
Liang's recurrent points became definitions of modernity for his 
generation and beyond: individuals overcoming a subservient nature 
(pointed out by this generation and later ones as a negative aspect of 
China's traditional culture) to one of a free citizen, building a united 
citizenry for a foundation of a stronger state, progress, struggle, and the re-
thinking of Chinese traditions and values. His prescription for democracy 
can be linked directly to all of these themes: his idea of democracy was 
meant to arouse, educate, and unite Chinese citizens for the purpose of 
strengthening and modernizing the Chinese nation to enable it to face the 
international struggle. 
So for the first time in China, the 1895 protest and the following 
study societies and political journals aimed to inspire and encourage the 
activity of a wider population than was historically involved in political 
deliberations.2 Modernizing political institutions meant democratizing 
2Kang and Liang focused their attention on the urban gentry and 
merchants, and while this is still rather elitist, it was a move in a more 
popular direction. The rural population did not receive significant 
attention until the late 1920s and '30s when Mao Zedong turned the 
attention of the Chinese Communist Party to arousing the peasant masses 
for political action. Mao later developed his own definition of 
participatory democracy, the basis of which can certainly be traced to Liang' s 
ideal of a united and politically active citizenry. Mao did read Liang's New 
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them, and this meant broadening political involvement by creating a 
politically aware citizenry who could restore the link between the ruler and 
ruled and revitalize the political institutions. Liang's political journals 
served to educate his new citizens through the diffusion of new, modern 
values. The study of political values and institutions was traditionally the 
preserve of the elite who aspired to pass the civil service examinations and 
acquire a government post and the corresponding privileges. While 
traditionally the literati studied and wrote in classical Chinese, Liang's 
political journals were written partially in the vernacular so that anyone 
with a level of functional literacy could read them and consider the newest 
political ideas of the day. This was Liang's democratic mode for creating 
"new citizens" for a modern China. 
Liang Qichao and most of his generation had been educated 
primarily in the Confucian tradition, and naturally they continued to use 
much of its vocabulary and political values to discuss Western methods of 
political reform. The idea of a politically active citizenry was modern, but 
Liang defined his new citizens in a way that blended tradition and 
modernity. For example, Liang affirmed the value of freedom and people's 
rights, but he saw the relationship between the state and the individual as 
harmonious and free of contention. In Liang' s conception, freedom was 
Citizen as a youth, stating that he "worshipped Kang and Liang", but in 
later years he dismissed Liang's generation of reformers as "bourgeois 
democrats." (Nathan 63) For more on Mao's definition of democracy, see 
the translation of his speech "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" in 
Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1971) 371-388 and Nathan's Chinese Democracy, footnoted 
above. 
intended to liberate the natural tendencies of individuals to educate 
themselves, and then they would naturally recognize their interest in 
uniting with fellow citizens for the common good. Liang wrote in 1900: 
Those who entertain no idea of self-benefit must inevitably 
abandon their rights, abdicate their responsibilities, and ultimately 
lose their independence ... .In the West there is a saying to the effect 
that Heaven helps him who helps himself. No calamity in life is 
greater than the failure to help oneself, hoping only that help will 
be forthcoming from others ... But no man can survive alone in the 
world, and for this reason the community comes into existence. 
Living within the community, among one's fellows, it is of course 
impossible to live completely to oneself, paying no heed to the 
question of whether something beneficial to oneself may harm 
others ... Thus those best able to benefit themselves must first be of 
benefit to the community. From this will follow benefit to 
themselves.3 
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Internal competition, that between individual citizens or between the 
citizens and the state, was negative in Liang's mind. It was necessary for 
Liang's educated and politically aware citizens to be united to strengthen 
China for the international struggle for freedom, freedom from the 
domination of outside groups. It is clear that Liang' s conception of 
democracy, a united and politically active citizenry, was inseparable from 
his ideal of a modern China that was strong and united. 
Though Liang did not subscribe to the virulent anti-Manchu 
nationalism that many of the revolutionaries of the time propounded, 
there was a similarity of purpose to political reform between Liang and his 
more radical contemporaries. Liang was wary of revolution and the 
destructive and chaotic forces that might follow. He was wary, especially 
after his trip in 1903 to America and his observation of Chinese 
3Greider, Intellectuals and the State 165. 
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communities there, of putting responsibility for the government in the 
hands of an uneducated public. For Liang and his generation, the most 
important duty at hand was the strengthening of the nation; reformers 
and revolutionaries alike wavered between a variety of plans for nation.-
building, some including an aspect of democracy and others postponing 
the instituting of democracy for a future date when conditions were 
deemed ready. During his brief period advocating "enlightened 
despotism" upon his return from the United States, he visualized his 
fellow citizens in a struggle for modernization, "those born in the 
thundering tempests of today, forged and molded by iron and fire -- they 
will be my citizens, twenty or thirty, nay, fifty years hence. Then we will 
give them Rousseau to read and speak to them of Washington." Though 
Liang changed his mind at times about the specifics of democratic 
institutions he desired and how soon democratic institutions could be 
implemented, democracy remained in his vision of a modern China. 
During the movement for a constitutional monarchy in the last 
years of the Qing empire, Liang reiterated his belief in the positive energy 
of the people in supervising the government. However, Liang did not 
intend to institute methods by which outside political forces could weaken 
the central government. He saw democracy as a way to strengthen the 
nation by uniting the people and the government. Because these new 
citizens would have a voice and an influence, a modern democratic 
concept, the government would be compelled to respond to this positive 
energy. Hence the government and the people would be united in 
modernizing and strengthening the nation. 
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With the establishment of the Republic in 1912, Liang continued to 
strive for gradual democratic reform and modernization. He continued to 
put his faith in political change as a means to modernization, but the next 
generation changed the emphasis of democratization to focus on social and 
cultural development. 
Democracy, Modernity and Cultural Reform 
Hu Shi came of age twenty years after Liang, in the 1910s, and the 
demise of the Confucian imperial system was already a fact. Since his 
schooling in Shanghai starting at age 12 in 1904, the fall of the imperial 
system was imminent, and Hu was exposed early on to many ideas from 
the West. The worth and potential of foreign-inspired methods and ways 
of thought was, by the time of his study in the United States, widely 
accepted among young intellectuals of Hu' s generation. 
Hu Shi's experiences in the United States made a deep and lasting 
impression on his personality and way of thought. Liang Qichao had been 
depressed by his visit to the United States in 1903; he felt that China was 
decades behind the United States, politically and economically, and was 
extremely discouraged by the condition of Chinese living in America. The 
imperialism that characterized American foreign policy at that time 
reinforced Liang's commitment to Chinese nationalism and its necessity 
for the modernization and strengthening of China. Hu Shi, on the other 
hand, arriving in the United States in 1910, was inspired by the optimism 
of Americans and their faith in progress. His stay in the United States 
corresponded with the era of Woodrow Wilson's idealism and 
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internationalism, and certainly this climate underlay Hu's cosmopolitan 
outlook, his commitment to pacifism, and his belief that nations can work 
together for the common good of humankind. 
Hu's time in the United States also allowed him to develop his 
strong commitment to democratic ideas apart from an immediate concern 
for the survival of China. Until 1937 when the war with Japan finally 
became too grave, Hu continuously pushed for democratic reforms on the 
basis of the ideals of independent thinking and reason. Hu had a more 
Western conception of human rights than Liang Qichao, who maintained 
that the interests of the people remain subordinate to that of the state. 
Even though a concern for the progress of China was still at the forefront 
of their thoughts, Hu and others of his generation were inclined to judge 
individual interests as valuable on their own, perhaps reflecting their own 
personal and intellectual detachment from society but also reasoning that 
modernity must be achieved person by person before society and nation 
can be modernized. 
Hu Shi can be associated with the New Culture Movement, roughly 
dated 1915-1927; this period does not have events demarcating ending and 
beginning, like Liang's generation with the 1895 Petition and the 1911 
Revolution, but it does have the pivotal 1919 May Fourth Movement at its 
center. Liang's generation of reformers and revolutionaries had attributed 
China's weakness to the failings of the Confucian state and the Manchu 
rulers. The debate of Liang's generation, while new and progressive for its 
time, had still been conducted largely under Confucian terms of 
renovating the relationship between ruler and ruled. But by 1915, the 
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failure of the founding of the Republic to make China strong had become 
distressingly apparent, and this next generation of intellectuals, to which 
Hu belonged, felt that the political debates of the previous generation had 
missed the mark. They felt that not only had the old Confucian system 
repressed the political energies of the people but that it had also 
perpetuated and entrenched an oppressive social order and ignored a vital 
popular culture. Thus, in order to achieve modernity for China, political 
revolution became secondary to a social and cultural movement. 
Hu Shi represented the May Fourth generation's emphasis on 
cultural revitalization over political reform in the task of China's 
modernization. In 1958, he wrote that "throughout my adult life I have 
always taken what I prefer to call a disinterested interest in politics as a 
civic duty of an educated man."4 
To me, democracy is a way of life, a habit of behavior, and science is 
a method, a method of thinking and knowing. Both Science and 
Democracy involve an attitude of mind or a habit of behavior, a 
way of living.5 
Hu Shi's attitude of mind seems well-suited to the ideals of 
democratic debate. He approached the study of problems systematically 
and pragmatically, open to new ways of looking at things that encouraged 
reasoned deliberation. Modern scientific methodologies allowed a re-
evaluation of Chinese history and cultural traditions. Modernity, for both 
Liang and Hu, involved re-thinking previously held assumptions, and like 
Liang's criticism of the traditional value of passive endurance, Hu 
4Hu Shih, Reminiscences of Dr. Hu Shih (Microfilm. New York: 
Columbia University, East Asian Institute, 1959) 38. 
5Hu Shih, Reminiscences 194. 
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criticized his fellow Chinese for having "never been willing to think, and 
only know(ing) how to conform, without holding opinions of our own." 
Whereas Liang valued education for its ability to arouse a politically aware 
population, Hu valued education for its capacity to generate questions and 
advocate critical thinking. The spirit of democracy, for Hu, encouraged a 
variety of opinions and ideas, and in this way, a modern, reasoning, 
knowledge-seeking public would develop. He believed that 
modernization rested in social education. 
Like Liang's protest of 1895, the principal event of Hu Shi's New 
Culture generation, the protest of May 4, 1919, reinforced the idea that 
protest is a justifiable expression of the people's concern with political 
events. However, the event also evolved into a rejection of the idea that 
political reform or even revolution could modernize China. The May 
Fourth generation was understandably disaffected from politics. This 
disaffection, however, spurred the exploration of an even wider 
investigation into new ideas beyond politics and on to culture and society. 
Confucianism was criticized in nearly all its aspects, especially now its 
social and cultural traditions. 
Hu Shi' s leadership in the literary revolution reflected the new 
emphasis on modernizing China's culture and social environment. As 
part of this generation's attack on the Confucian social order, the literary 
movement aimed to break down social barriers between the elite and the 
general population, a kind of cultural and educational democratization in 
literature. Foreshadowing this movement of the 1910s were Liang 
Qichao's political journals of the previous decades; they too were written 
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partially in the vernacular in order to arouse a wider audience to political 
awareness and action. Liang approved the extenuation of the vernacular 
to the literary realm, writing: 
To renovate the people of a nation, the fictional literature of that 
nation must first be renovated. Thus to renovate morality, we 
must first renovate fiction, ... to renovate learning and the arts, we 
must first renovate fiction, and even to renew the people's hearts 
and minds and remold their character, we must first renovate 
fiction.6 
Hu Shi insisted that he was not creating something new but that 
vernacular literature had been a vital and indigenous art for centuries, 
from the vernacular novels of the Ming and Qing to the informally 
written dialogues of Zhu Xi and other Neo-Confucian thinkers of the Song 
period. However, elevating the vernacular to the status of high art was a 
new development with wide cultural and social implications. Hu was 
convinced this was necessary for China's cultural and social 
modernization, for he argued that unless the vernacular language became 
the universal language of the new culture, the consequence would be "to 
divide society into two classes: on the one side, 'we,' the gentry; and on the 
other side, 'they,' the common people, the masses."7 In Hu Shi's own 
words, the literary revolution was "a movement of reason versus 
tradition, freedom versus authority, and glorification of life and human 
values versus their suppression." Recognizing the worth of reason, 
freedom and human values were, for Hu, in the spirit of democracy and 
6c.T. Hsia, "Yen Fu and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao as Advocates of New Fiction." In 
Adele A. Rickett, ed. Chinese Approaches to Literature from Confucius to 
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) 222-223. 
7 Greider, Intellectuals and the State 230. 
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modernization and reflect his generation's preoccupation with social and 
cultural progress. "Democracy .. .is no more and no less than the sum total 
of all the democratized and democratizing forces, social, economic, moral, 
and intellectual." 
In the political realm, Hu's advocacy of constitutionalism and other 
political proposals was characterized by a more Western orientation than 
Liang's ideas had been, reflecting both personal differences and differences 
in their generations. Because Hu abandoned his Confucian education and 
was introduced to Western ideas at an early age, he was freed from relying 
on Confucian vocabulary. Moreover, Hu's years in the United States 
unquestionably had a lasting influence on his ideas about politics. His 
sense of distance from the political arena probably stemmed both from his 
time away from China and the New Culture generation's detachment from 
politics. 
While Liang had maintained that a constitution would strengthen 
the state because the interests of the state would naturally coincide with 
individual interests, Hu Shi understood constitutionalism in an American 
way. He held that the purpose of a constitution would be to limit the 
government's authority, and that it meant the establishment of the rule of 
law. Hu Shi did believe in a strong government -- "a government with a 
plan" -- yet he did not uphold the need for a period of political tutelage, as 
Liang had. He believed that the best way to have democracy "was to have 
democracy;" he admitted that leadership in government took some 
sophisticated knowledge, but that the average person's participation did 
not. He held that having democracy would be an educative process in 
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itself and gradually the base of a progressive, enlightened populace would 
emerge and a modern China would evolve. As Jerome Greider put it, Hu 
Shi "was disposed to think of democracy less as a specific institutional 
system than as a state of mind, an extension into the sphere of political and 
social life of the tolerant and critical spirit of science, though he did not 
slight the importance of democratic institutions as a means of preventing 
political abuse and insuring the preservation of sufficient standards of 
political, social, and intellectual liberty."8 
Constant Democratic Trends between Liang and Hu 
Both Liang Qichao and Hu Shi advocated opening participation in 
politics by a much wider spectrum of the population than had previously 
been involved. Liang Qichao, as a leader (with Kang Youwei) of the 1895 
Petition, was a pioneer in this respect, as this was the first time that people 
without government posts attempted to influence government policy. 
This was a revolutionary proposal, and though the protesters in 1895 did 
not achieve their demands, the idea that people outside the government 
structure had a role to play in politics was soon widely accepted, even 
though the nature of their role remained (and still remains) disputed. 
Liang and Hu both believed that education was the key to 
modernization for its ability to arouse awareness and widen participation 
in politics and public life in general. As intellectuals, their roles were that 
of educators. Liang's conception of new citizens did address cultural and 
social issues by his criticism the Confucian-encouraged tendency for people 
8Greider, Hu Shih 326. 
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to passively accept fate rather than to actively strive for a better future. 
This social and cultural critique was meant to serve the primary purpose of 
political renewal, but it was a first step towards the wider social and 
cultural criticism of Hu Shi and his generation, when social and cultural 
transformation became the fundamental concern. Both Liang and Hu 
considered their thoughts democratic because their ideas entailed popular 
participation in modernizing society and political institutions. 
Liang and Hu both were drawn to democracy as a means to 
modernize and strengthen the Chinese nation, but the difference between 
Liang' s focus on national strength and Hu' s more cosmopolitan viewpoint 
corresponds with wider political and cultural events as well as their own 
personal backgrounds. Liang and his generation concentrated their efforts 
on modernizing the political structure, and thus the value of democracy 
was in its blueprint for political modernization. Hu and his generation 
moved beyond the political realm to attend to modernization in the social 
and cultural order. Democracy for Hu's generation meant modernization 
not only in politics but in all other aspects of life as well. 
In their educational roles, both Liang and Hu transmitted foreign 
ideas through their writings to other young Chinese intellectuals. They 
prompted their fellow citizens to look at China and the world in a new 
way. They criticized the traditional Chinese values of passivity, 
subservience, and conformity as one reason behind China's national and 
international predicament, and argued that these characteristics were 
incompatible with the modern world. They both consciously blended 
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tradition and modernity in their interpretations of democratic reforms and 
in their prescriptions for modernization. 
While much of their work can be called revolutionary, in that it 
contributed much to the revolutionary causes of their times, neither Liang 
nor Hu were revolutionaries themselves. They were moderates, 
committed to gradual (though profound) change, wary of and dismayed by 
the chaos caused by their more radical contemporaries. Though they both 
bitterly criticized the governments under which they worked, they both 
preferred to reform the existing power structure rather than overthrow it. 
They both believed that education would naturally cause their compatriots 
to unite to work for the common good of the Chinese society and nation. 
Even though many of Liang's and Hu's particular prescriptions for 
reform ultimately lost out to more radical forces, their influence was far 
broader and long-lasting than any one political or social movement. Ideas 
that were new in Liang's time, such as the importance of nationalism and 
the idea that modernization meant more than acquiring scientific 
expertise, were taken for granted by Hu's time. Hu expanded on the work 
that Liang had done, in the realms of education and in the progression of 
the conception of modernization and democracy to include cultural and 
social transformation. The link between modernization and democracy 
was firmly established, even though the intellectuals of their times and 
later wavered between whether democracy led to modernization or 
whether modernization led to democracy. 
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EPILOGUE 
China of the 1990s continues to struggle with its definitions of 
democracy and modernity in much the same way as Liang Qichao and Hu 
Shi had. The goal of China's Communist Revolution remains the 
attainment of an independent modern society and nation, and the various 
social and political campaigns since 1949 have continued to reflect this 
highest national purpose. 
The democratic ideal of a politically active citizenry has remained 
one of the most important political values throughout the Communist era 
(though, of course, one would question the democratic nature of mass 
participation orchestrated by the highest levels of government). The 
enduring importance of political activism reflects the lasting belief that an 
active citizenry will strengthen and modernize the nation. And while 
critical thought and free expression have not been encouraged under 
Communist rule, it seems clear from the periods during which 
unapproved criticisms were expressed, such as the Hundred Flowers 
Movement (1957), Democracy Wall (1978-79), and the protests of the late 
1980s, that critical thinking and free expression remain an ideal of 
intellectuals and others. These brief intervals also show that spontaneous 
protest from outside the ranks of officialdom is still considered, by many 
Chinese, a patriotic demonstration of concern for the conditions of society 
and nation. 
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Democracy continues to be one of the most powerful words used by 
Chinese who discuss their nation's progress. China's leaders speak of 
democracy as a kind of spirit or feeling which unifies citizens and leaders 
to work together for the common good. The fact that leaders as well as 
dissidents feel the need to use the term democracy to discuss China's 
society and politics reveals the power of the word. While there is 
disagreement among Chinese officials, youth, and other citizens about 
what democracy is, exactly, it is agreed that democracy is necessary for 
China's modernization. 
Some Chinese see democracy in a more concrete way, as a system 
which can ensure involvement by ordinary people and their influence on 
government procedures. Though there are some contemporary Chinese 
who value democracy for its protection of individual rights, the majority 
still speak of its higher potential for strengthening the nation. Most of the 
1989 Tiananmen Square protesters were not revolutionaries, seeking the 
overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party, but were reformers, hoping to 
curb bureaucratic corruption, open government procedures to public 
supervision, and loosen government controls of the press. The 
demonstrations illustrated the breakdown in the relations between the 
rulers and ruled and the desire of the educated youth, and others, not to 
weaken the government but to make it stronger by repairing 
communication between the government and the people and pushing for 
a greater influence on public policy by ordinary citizens. 
It is safe to say that in the 1990s, the social, economic, and political 
distance between the rulers and ruled in China is continuing to widen, as 
1 ()9 
the Deng Xiaoping (1904- ) era of the 1980s and '90s brings great prosperity 
to some and leaves others far behind. The definitions of democracy 
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